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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. sec. 78A-3-102(3)(a).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE 1:

Whether the majority of the court of appeals' panel erred in its assessment
of the district court's summary judgments. (Pet. Cert. 1.)

Standard of review: On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of
the Utah Court of Appeals (rather than that of the trial court)
for correctness. Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, ^[ 8, 152
P.3d 312,313 (Utah 2007). The inquiry focuses on whether
the court of appeals "correctly reviewed the trial court's
decision under the appropriate standard of review." Id.
(citation and quotations omitted).

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/Petitioners Sunridge Development Corporation ("SDC") and Sunridge
Enterprises, LLC ("SEL") filed suit against Defendant/Respondent RB&G Engineering,
Inc. ("RB&G") on February 5, 2003, alleging negligence and breach of contract for
RB&G's failure to identify geologic faults in a property development (despite evaluating
the property on two separate occasions, first in 1993 and again in 1995). (R. at 1, 370,
392-93.) Ignorant of RB&G's breaches, and relying on RB&G's reports, SDC/SEL
designed the development over the faults. (R. at 10.) After construction began,
SDC/SEL learned of RB&G's breaches when the Utah Geological Association conducted
a survey and discovered the geologic faults. (R. at 384.) Based on the Association's
conclusions, Provo City required SDC/SEL to build around the faults, which meant
SDC/SEL could not construct and sell fourteen of the planned eighty-six units, which
translated to a loss of over one million dollars for SDC/SEL. (R. at 3 84.)
On March 8, 2005, RB&G filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Partial
Summary Judgment ("First Summary Judgment"). (R. at 225.) Five months later, on
August 2, 2005, the trial court granted RB&G's motion, holding that (1) SDC and SEL
could not maintain their negligence claims, and (2) the economic loss rule, as well as lack
of contractual privity between SEL and RB&G, precluded SEL from recovering for the
inability to develop fourteen units as a result of RB&G's admitted failure to identify
geologic faults in the development. (R. at 538.) (A copy of this ruling is attached hereto
as Addendum 1.) This ruling effectively quashed all of SEL's claims and left SDC as
the remaining plaintiff. SDC's only remaining damages were those associated with the
2

delay caused by RB&G's failure to identify the faults in the development (approximately
$224,727) (r. at 395-98), but not the damages for the lost fourteen units themselves
(approximately $1,057,983.41) (r. at 395).
More than a year after the trial court's ruling on the First Summary Judgment, on
July 18, 2006, RB&G filed another Motion for Summary Judgment ("Second Summary
Judgment").1 (R. at 576). In the Second Summary Judgment, RB&G sought to dispose
of what remained of SDC's and SEL's case. RB&G argued that in light of the trial
court's favorable ruling on the First Summary Judgment, the only damages remaining
were those stemming from SDC's breach of contract claims, which only included
recovery for payroll, utilities, trenching/backfilling studies, office fees, and related
expenses stemming from the delay after the faults were discovered (collectively referred
to as "Administrative Damages"), all of which totaled approximately $224,727. (R. at
579.) In opposition to the Second Summary Judgment, SDC/SEL submitted the affidavit
of Stephen Stewart (the principal of both SDC and SEL) which outlined and verified the
Administrative Damages that SDC incurred. (R. at 648-49.) In its reply memorandum,
RB&G argued that Stewart's affidavit was untimely because it was submitted after the

1

The Utah Court of Appeals misunderstood the procedural posture of this case as
indicated by the court confusing the dates of RB&G's two summary judgment motions,
saying the trial court ruled on RB&G's motions for summary judgment "[i]n August and
September of 2005 .. . ." Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g, Inc., 2008 UT App 29, \
4, 177 P.3d 644, 645 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). In fact, RB&G's two summary judgment
motions were more than a year apart.
More importantly, as discussed infra, the court of appeals confused the damages at
issue in the First and Second Summary Judgments as well as the effect of the parties'
agreement that SDC/SEL could appeal the First Summary Judgment, but not the Second
Summary Judgment. Id. ^[ 4-6, 9-11.
3

dispositive motion deadline, and as a result, SDC had not introduced admissible prima
facie evidence of its Administrative Damages of $224,727. (R. at 689-95.) The trial
court agreed with RB&G and granted its Second Summary Judgment. (R. at 698.) (A
copy of this ruling is attached hereto as Addendum 2.)
Subsequently, the parties agreed to effectively end the case. On December 18,
2006, they stipulated to dismiss the matter, subject to the following provisions:
1.

SDC and SEL could appeal the trial court's order on the First Summary

Judgment (which precluded recovery for the lost fourteen units, which barred SDC's and
SEL's negligence claims based on the economic loss rule, which found no privity
between SEL and RB&G, and which limited SEL's damages to damages that SDC had
incurred). (R. at 737.)
2.

SDC and SEL waived their rights to appeal the trial court's order on the

Second Summary Judgment (which dealt only with SEC's recovery of its $224,727 in
Administrative Damages, evidence of which the trial court excluded because SDC/SEL
did not timely submit admissible prima facie evidence of damages). (R. at 737-38.) (A
copy of the parties' Stipulated Motion to Dismiss is attached hereto as Addendum 3.)
Thereafter, SDC and SEL filed its Notice of Appeal. (R. at 742.) On January 25,
2008, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision, affirming the trial court's holding
that "SDC did not present prima facie evidence of damages" (which, as part of the
Second Summary Judgment, SDC/SEL agreed not to appeal and did not appeal pursuant
to the December 18, 2006 stipulation). Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g, 2008 UT
App 29, Tf 1. Therefore, the court of appeals reasoned, both SDC and SEL's claims failed
4

in their entirety. Id. ^ 11.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In March 1969, Stephen Stewart ("Stewart") formed Plaintiff/Petitioner Sunridge
Development Corporation ("SDC"). (R. at 368, 392.) Stewart is a principal of SDC. (R.
at 392.)
Several years later, in 1981, SDC purchased an 87-acre parcel in the City of
Provo, 10.2 acres of which would later become the Alpine Brook development
("Property"), the property at issue in this case. (R. at 373.)
SDC Commissions the First Geologic Report
In 1993, prior to developing the Property, SDC contracted with RB&G to perform,
among other things, a geologic study of the Property. (R. at 392-93.) On June 23, 1993,
RB&G submitted its report (in the form of a two-page letter, excluding attached maps) to
SDC ("1993 Report"), and RB&G invoiced SDC for the analysis. (R. at 370.) The 1993
Report analyzed potential faults and other geologic features of the Property. (R. at 284.)
It states, in part, that "the faults depicted on the map [attached to the Report] do not
necessarily exist" and that "[t]here is a real possibility that these faults represent linear
features which were misidentified by previous investigators." (R. at 285 (emphases
added).)
SDC Commissions Another Geologic Report
Two years later, in 1995, SDC again commissioned RB&G, via oral contract, to
conduct a geotechnical investigation of the Property. (R. at 370, 393.) SDC wanted
RB&G to determine whether geological hazards existed throughout the Property and to

5

provide recommendations for foundation design. (R. at 393.) On August 4, 1995,
RB&G provided SDC with its report ("1995 Report"). (R. at 291, 370.) The 1995
Report provided, in part, that there were only small faults on the Property, but that such
faults were expected for the area and that the faults would not pose development
problems. (R. at 10.) SDC, relying on RB&G's two evaluations and recommendations,
proceeded with developing the Property irrespective of the supposedly "misidentified,"
non-existent geologic faults. (R. at 10.)
SDC Organizes its Sister Entity, Plaintiff/Petitioner Sunridge Enterprises, LLC,
and SDC Conveys the Property to SEL
In March 1996, Stewart formed Plaintiff/Petitioner Sunridge Enterprises, LLC
("SEL"). (R. at 368-69.) Stewart is a principal of SEL, just as he is a principal of SDC.
(R. at 392.)
In 1996 SDC conveyed the Property to SEL for development. (R. at 393.) At the
time of the conveyance, based on the 1993 and 1995 Reports, the Property would
accommodate 86 units. (R. at 393.)
In conjunction with SDC's conveyance of the Property to SEL, SDC also assigned
and transferred all of its rights and claims regarding the various engineering reports,
surveys, studies, and zoning approvals, etc., to SEL. (R. at 393.)
SEL Continues to Develop the Property but Is Forced to Redesign the Property to
Accommodate Newly Discovered Faults that RJB&G Missed
Subsequently, SEL continued to develop the Property, including applying for the
required permits from Provo City. (R. at 393-94.) Then, on October 27, 1998, Richard
Giraud of the Utah Geological Survey sent the City of Provo a letter discussing concerns
6

he had with the 1993 and 1995 Reports, including a recommendation that "further
evaluation of surface fault rupture is necessary, and that slope-stability, debris-flow,
flooding, and rock-fall hazards [must] be addressed." (R. at 394, 435.) The Utah
Geological Association ("UGA") then recommended additional testing, which—when
performed—uncovered faults that RB&G missed and said did not exist in its 1993 and
1995 Reports. (R. at 384.)
Based on the UGA's discoveries, Provo City required, among other things, that
certain fault set-backs be incorporated into the Property's design. (R. at 384.)
Additionally, Provo City officials stopped the Property's development at various times
from 1996 forward until SEL redesigned the Property to accommodate the faults. (R. at
394-35.)
This redesign and the set-back reduced the number of developable units by
fourteen, amounting to a loss of $1,057,983.41. (R. at 395.) Had SDC or SEL known
about the faults in 1993 or 1995, it would have designed the Property such that the fault
areas could have been open space, such as parks, roads, or storm retention areas. (R. at
395-96.) But by the time the mistake was discovered, the first phase of the development
was almost complete, and the location of the road could not be moved. Id.
SDC and SEL Suffer Additional Losses Based on
Their Reliance on the 1993 and 1995 Reports
Development of the Property suffered due to SDC and SEL's reliance on the 1993
and 1995 Reports. (R. at 396.) For example, the state engineer had to conduct additional
inspections, leading to delays. (R. at 396.) The whole development shut down during

7

these delays. (R. at 396.)
Additionally, both SDC and SEL suffered additional losses because of their
reliance on the 1993 and 1995 Reports. These losses are detailed below.2
1 ENTITY [
CATEGORY
SEL
Lost 14 units
SDC

SDC

SDC/SEL

SDC/SEL

SEL

SDC/SEL

SEL

SDC

SEL

1 AMOUNT rOTATION | ADDRESSED IN:
$1,057,983.41 R. at 395
\ FIRST Summary
J'ment (appealable)
Payroll
$612,186
R. at 396
1 Part of Second
Summary J'ment
(NOT appealable)
Trenching and
$3150
R. at 397
1 Part of Second
backfilling studies
Summary J'ment
(NOT appealable)
Office and overhead $9500
R. at 397
1 Part of Second
Summary J'ment
(NOT appealable)
Utilities
$3300
R. at 397
Part of Second
1
Summary J'ment
(NOT appealable)
Additional RB&G
R. at 397
$35,589
Part of Second
reports/tests
Summary J'ment
(NOT appealable)
$4891
R. at 398
Part of Second
Attorneys' fees
Summary J'ment
(NOT appealable)
R. at 398
Part of Second
Attorneys' fees
$285
Summary J'ment
(NOT appealable)
R. at 398
$675
Second Summary
Property redesign
J'ment (NOT
appealable)
R. at 398
Second Summary
Landscaping/grading $18,000
J'ment (NOT
the fault zone
appealable)
|
|
TOTAL: $1,745,559.41

2

Only the first category of damages (the lost fourteen units) was at issue before
the court of appeals and is at issue in this appeal. The remaining issues were resolved by
stipulation of the parties on December 14, 2006. (R. at 738.)
8

Based on these damages, SDC and SEL brought suit on February 5, 2003. (R. at
1.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the Utah Court of Appeals' decision because it based
that decision on three key facts that the court misunderstood and that contradict the
record.
First and most importantly, the court misunderstood the distinctions between
RB&G's first and second summary judgment motions and the trial court's rulings on
both. RB&G's two summary judgments sought to dispose of two different categories of
damages. The first summary judgment sought to prevent SDC and SEL from recovering
over one million dollars for being unable to develop fourteen of the planned eighty-six
units based on RB&G failing to identify geologic faults in the development. The second
summary judgment sought to prevent SDC from recovering the balance of what it sough:
Administrative Damages (payroll, redesign fees, etc.), which were the product of the
delay that SDC/SEL suffered from having to redesign the development after the geologic
faults were discovered. The trial court held that SDC failed to timely introduce evidence
of its Administrative Damages, so it could not recover those sums. (And SDC/SEL
agreed not to appeal the second summary judgment.) But the trial court never found that
that SDC/SEL failed to timely present evidence of damage for the lost fourteen units.
Yet that is precisely what the court of appeals held (and misunderstood).
Second, the court misconstrued SDC/SEL's agreement not to appeal the trial
court's decision granting RB&G's second summary judgment. And third, the court did
9

not recognize that Stephen Stewart, the principal of both SDC and SEL, filed an affidavit
in April 2005 (before the dispositive motion deadline) detailing the damages to both SDC
and SEL sufficient to overcome RB&G's motions for summary judgment.
Having shown how the court of appeals misconstrued several facts from the
record, SDC and SEL move to their substantive arguments why they should be able to
recover for the lost fourteen units.
First, SEL can recover the lost revenue from the lost fourteen units because SDC's
assignment to SEL of all SDC's rights vis-a-vis the RB&G contracts, which puts SEL
and RB&G in privity of contract. When an assignor assigns its interest in a contract, the
assignor loses privity with the original obligor, but the assignee gains privity with the
original obligor. This occurred in the instant case.
Second, the SME Industries case does not preclude recovery of the fourteen units.
RB&G and the trial court misunderstood the facts of that case and the fact that SME, the
assignee on a contract, was limited to the assignor's damages (only $150,000) because
the assignor had already incurred a maximum of $150,000 in damages. Thus, that was all
SME could recover.
Third, alternatively, if the Court finds no privity between SEL and RB&G, then
SDC remains in privity of contract with RB&G, and SDC can recover consequential
damages pursuant to RB&G's conceded breach.
Fourth, even if the economic loss rule applies to SDC's negligence claim against
RB&G, the Court should establish that professional engineers, like RB&G, have an
independent duty to competently and thoroughly perform their duties. The Utah Supreme
10

Court left as an open question whether professionals like engineers are subject to this
independent duty, and this case presents a ripe opportunity for the Court to prevent the
erosion of tort liability by establishing an independent duty for professional engineers
when they are not in privity of contract with the injured party.
Professional engineers are in a position to foresee that negligence on their part will
result in substantial economic and non-economic damages for their clients. Additionally,
parties rely upon engineers' esoteric knowledge and expertise, and engineers know that.
Finally, there is an information asymmetry between professional engineers and their
clients such that their clients are forced to rely upon the engineers to accurately and
thoroughly complete their tasks. Courts across the country are increasingly limiting the
application of the economic loss rule since it effectively extinguishes tort claims. The
poison pill that is the economic loss rule is admittedly valuable in some contexts, but the
courts should limit its application.
Last, if the Court declines to find for SDC and SEL on the other issues, the Court
should exercise its broad equitable power and allow SDC and SEL to recover damages.
Otherwise, RB&G's liability disappears, and it is liability proof in spite of its negligence
and breaches. The Court should not allow RB&G to escape liability through this legal
black hole.
ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT OF APPEALS BASED ITS DECISION ON THREE KEY
FACTS WHICH IT MISUNDERSTOOD AND WHICH CONTRADICT
THE RECORD,
This Court should reverse the Utah Court of Appeals' decision because it based its
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decision on three key facts that the court misunderstood and that contradict the record.
First, the court misunderstood the distinctions between RB&G's first and second
summary judgment motions and the trial court's rulings on both. Second (and likely
based on the confusion of the two summary judgments), the court misconstrued
SDC/SEL's agreement not to appeal the trial court's decision granting RB&G's second
summary judgment. And third, the court did not recognize that Stephen Stewart, the
principal of both SDC and SEL, filed an affidavit in April 2005 {before the dispositive
motion deadline) detailing the damages to both SDC and SEL sufficient to overcome
RB&G's summary judgments.
A.

The Court of Appeals Misunderstood the Damages at Issue in the First and
Second Motions for Summary Judgment, Which Caused the Court to Err in
Holding that Neither SDC nor SEL could Recover for the Lost 14 Units.

The court of appeals misunderstood RB&G's two motions for summary judgment,
the damages at issue in each motion, and the trial court's rulings on the motions. In sum,
the court of appeals held that since SDC/SEL did not timely present evidence of one
category of damages (which were at issue in the second summary judgment), SDC/SEL
could not recover for the other category of damages (which were at issue in the first
summary judgment). The court's conclusion cannot logically flow from the facts and
procedural history of the case.
This case involves two categories of damages. First, $1,057,983.41 in damages
for SDC/SEL losing the ability to develop fourteen of the planned units due to RB&G
failing to discovery geologic faults in the development. (R. at 395-96). And second,
$224,727 in damages ("Administrative Damages") for delays and for redesigning the
12

development after Provo City prohibited SDC/SEL from building over the geologic faults
that RB&G previously failed to identify. (R. at 396-98).
RB&G's first summary judgment3 sought to prevent SDC/SEL from recovering
the first category of damages (the lost fourteen units). (R. at 225-366.) RB&G argued
that the economic loss rule and lack of privity between SEL and RB&G prohibited either
SDC or SEL from recovering for the lost fourteen units. (R. at 235-41.) SDC/SEL filed
an opposition, arguing the contrary position. (R. at 367-391.) Simultaneously, SDC/SEL
filed an affidavit of Stephen Stewart4 (the principal of SDC and SEL) which outlined in
detail the damages that SDC/SEL suffered, including damages for the lost fourteen units
as well as SDC/SEL's Administrative Damages. (R. at 392-496.)
But on August 2, 2005, the trial court granted RB&G's first summary judgment,
holding that (1) SDC and SEL could not maintain their negligence claims, and (2) the
economic loss rule, as well as lack of contractual privity between SEL and RB&G,
precluded SEL from recovering for the inability to develop the fourteen units. (R. at
538.) (Add, 1.) This ruling effectively terminated all of SEL's claims and left SDC as
the remaining plaintiff. And SDC's only remaining damages were the Administrative
Damages of approximately $224,727 (r. at 395-98), but not the damages for the lost
fourteen units themselves (r. at 395).
The history of RB&G's two motions for summary judgment, what each sought,
and how the trial court ruled on each are more fully explained in the "Statement of the
Case" on pages 3-5 supra. SDC/SEL incorporates that section by reference.
4
SDC/SEL filed this damages affidavit well before Stewart's August 28, 2006
damages affidavit, which the trial court excluded because it was filed after the dispositive
motion deadline (and which the court of appeals used to justify its decision affirming the
trial court's grant of summary judgments).
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RB&G then sought to dispose of SDC/SEL's remaining claim for Administrative
Damages, so it filed its second summary judgment. (R. at 576-641.) In opposition, on
August 28, 2006, SDC/SEL submitted another affidavit of Stephen Stewart which
outlined and verified the Administrative Damages that SDC incurred. (R. at 648-49.) In
its reply memorandum, RB&G argued that Stewart's affidavit was untimely because it
was submitted after the dispositive motion deadline, and as a result, SDC had not
introduced admissible prima facie evidence of its Administrative Damages of $224,727.
(R. at 689-95.) On September 12, 2006,5 the trial court granted RB&G's second
summary judgment, holding that Stewart's August 28, 2006 affidavit was untimely, and
therefore, SDC had failed to timely present evidence of its Administrative Damages. (R.
at 698.) (Add. 2.) Importantly, with this ruling, the trial court held only that SDC had
failed to timely present evidence of its $224,727 in Administrative damages, not that
SDC/SEL failed to timely present evidence of the $1,057,983.41 in damages from the lost
fourteen units.
This damages analysis is where the court of appeals erred in reaching its decision.
When the trial court granted RB&G's second summary judgment, the court wiped out
SDC's ability to recover its $224,727 in Administrative Damages because SDC allegedly
failed to timely provide evidence of those damages. (Add. 2.) In contrast, the lost
fourteen units were the subject of the first summary judgment, not the second summary
5

The court of appeals incorrectly recited that the trial court "ruled in favor of
RB&G on two separate motions for summary judgment" in "August and September 2005
. . . .") Sunridge, 2008 UT App 29, Tf 4, 177 P.3d at 645. The trial court actually ruled on
RB&G's first motion on August 2, 2005 (r. at 538-42), and it ruled on the second motion
more than a year later on September 12, 2006 (r. at 698-704).
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judgment (which SDC/SEL agreed not to appeal, r. at 737-38), and the trial court made
no finding or ruling that SDC or SEL failed to provide timely evidence of damages for
the lost fourteen units, which the court of appeals seemed to bootstrap into the trial
court's ruling on the second summary judgment.
Judge Bench's persuasive dissenting opinion in the court of appeals captured this
distinction and illuminated the analytical and factual flaws in the majority's opinion.
SunridgeDev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g, Inc., 2008 UT App 29,1ff[ 13-18, 177 P.3d at 64748. (A copy of the court of appeals' decision is attached hereto as Addendum 4.) First,
Judge Bench succinctly and accurately recited the history of RB&G's two summary
judgment motions, the outcome of each, and the correct issue on appeal. Id. f 13. "The
issues before [the court of appeals were] focused on the summary judgment entered
against SEL in September of 2005," not the summary judgment entered against SDC in
October 2006. Id.
Judge Bench then emphasized the crux of SDC/SEL's appeal and the flaw in the
majority's opinion: "[t]he majority fails to analyze the central issue presented: whether
SEL was in privity with RB&G for purposes of asserting a breach of contract claim." Id.
If 14. Without so much as even tangentially addressing the privity issue, the majority
u

skip[ped] ahead and use[d] the trial court's later dismissal of SDC's breach of contract

claim [in RB&G's Second Summary Judgment], on procedural grounds, as retroactive
justification for thwarting SEL's appeal." Id. Privity was "a paramount consideration in
this case," Judge Bench asserted. Id. ^ 15. The trial court was "wrong about SEL's
privity with RB&G," so the case should not have proceeded as it did. Id.
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Last, the majority utterly failed to address SEL's alternative argument, "that the
economic loss rule should not bar its claim of negligence." Id. ^ 17. In spite of the
majority's conclusion that SEL has no contractual claims to pursue, the majority "must
[still] deal with SEL's alternative argument for negligence," which they did not do. Id.
Therefore, the court of appeals erred when it held that neither SDC nor SEL could
recover for the lost fourteen units based on the court's reasoning that SDC failed to
provide prima facie evidence of its damages. The court conflated or misunderstood the
operation and scope of the first and second summary judgments. SDC/SEL's alleged
untimely submission of Stewart's August 28, 2006 affidavit as evidence of
Administrative Damages in connection with RB&G's second summary judgment did not
and does not affect SDC/SEL's ability to appeal or recover SDC/SEL's damages for the
lost fourteen units which were at issue in the first summary judgment.
B.

The Court of Appeals Incorrectly Held that SDC and SEL Could Not
Recover for the Lost 14 Units fat Issue in the First Summary Judgment)
because SDC and SEL Stipulated Not to Appeal the Ruling Prohibiting
Recovery of the Administrative Damages (as Issue in the Second Summary
Judgment).

Another point of confusion for the court of appeals was SDC/SEL's agreement not
to appeal the second summary judgment. After the trial court granted RB&G's second
summary judgment, the parties agreed to end the case by way of a Stipulated Motion to
Dismiss. (R. at 737-38.) The stipulation provided the following.
•

SDC and SEL could appeal the trial court's order on the First Summary Judgment
(which precluded recovery for the lost fourteen units, which barred SDC's and
SEL's negligence claims based on the economic loss rule, which found no privity
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between SEL and RB&G, and which limited SEL's damages to damages that SDC
had incurred). (R. at 737.)
• SDC and SEL waived their rights to appeal the trial court's order on the Second
Summary Judgment (which dealt only with SEC's recovery of its $224,727 in
Administrative Damages, evidence of which the trial court excluded because
SDC/SEL did not timely submit admissible prima facie evidence of damages ).
(R. at 737-38.) (Add. 3.)
After conflating the damages at issue in the first and second summary judgments,
the court of appeals then concluded that because SDC and SEL "agreed not to appeal the
trial court's granting of the second motion for summary judgment, both SDC and SEL are
precluded from claiming any damages against RB&G, whether sounding in contract or
torts." Sunridge, 2008 UT App 29, Tf 11, 177 P.3d at 647 (emphases added).
Clearly, based on its misunderstanding of the damages at issue in the first and
second summary judgments, the court of appeals erred when it concluded that neither
SDC nor SEL could recover for the lost fourteen units (at issue in the first summary
judgment) because SDC and SEL agreed not to appeal the second summary judgment.
This constitutes plain error that this Court should correct.
C.

The Court of Appeals Ignored Evidence of SDC/SEL's Damages in the
Form of Stewart's April 8, 2005 Affidavit.

Finally, the court of appeals failed to recognize—notwithstanding all the
foregoing arguments—that on April 8, 2005, a year before the dispositive motion
deadline, SDC/SEL filed an affidavit of Stephen Stewart (the principal of SDC and SEL).
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(R. at 392-496). This affidavit, which specifically detailed SDC's and SEL's damages
(including the lost fourteen units and SDC's Administrative Damages) was sufficient to
overcome RG&G's two motions for summary judgment. Or at a minimum, it established
the evidence necessary to overcome RB&G's second summary judgment motion, which
the trial court granted and held that SDC/SEL had failed to timely introduce evidence of
Administrative Damages. (R. at 698-704.)
As Judge Bench pointed out in his dissent, the majority "ignore[d] evidence in the
record that should have moved SEL's claim past summary judgment." Id. If 16.
Stewart's April 2005 damages affidavit outlined "in specific dollar amounts" SDC's
damages stemming from RB&G's failure to detect the faults on the Property. Id. This
sworn statement was sufficient to crate a genuine issue of material fact, Judge Bench
rightly argued. Id. Therefore, the trial court should not have granted RB&G's First
Summary Judgment. Id.
Stewart's "one sworn statement" was sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191,191 (Utah 1975). Therefore, the
court of appeals should have reversed the trial court's grants of summary judgment.
IL

SEL CAN RECOVER DAMAGES FOR THE LOST 14 UNITS BECAUSE
THE ASSIGNMENT FROM SDC TO SEL CREATED PRIVITY
BETWEEN SEL AND RB&G.
Having argued that the court of appeals incorrectly affirmed the trial court,

SDC/SEL now turn to the substance of their arguments.
In 1996, when SDC sold the Property to SEL, SDC also assigned its universe of
rights and claims regarding, among others, the various engineering reports, surveys,
18

studies, and zoning approvals. (R. at 393.) So SEL "stands in the shoes" of SDC with
respect to all rights, duties, and obligations SDC held. By virtue of this assignment, there
is privity between SEL and RB&G, and therefore, SEL can recover the loss for the
fourteen units.
A.

An Assignment Creates Privity Between the Assignee and the Remaining
Obligor on the Contract.

Under Utah law, an assignment operates to create privity between the assignee and
the original obligor on a contract. The Utah Supreme Court explicitly so held in Spears
v. Warr, in which the defendants, the Warrs, sold certain real property to the Crittendens
via warranty deed. 44 P.3d 742, 746 (Utah 2002) {overruled on other grounds by RHN
Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935 (Utah 2004)). The Warrs represented to the Crittendens
that the sale included irrigation rights on the property, but after the sale, they refused to
honor that representation, and unfortunately, the deed did not contain the agreement
concerning irrigation. Id. at 746-47. Subsequently, the Crittendens sold the property to
the Lewises, one of the plaintiffs. Id. at 747 n.5. In addition, the Crittendens also
quitclaimed any and all water rights which the Lewises had in the property. Id.
The plaintiffs, including the Lewises, sued the Warrs, and the trial court held for
the plaintiffs, ordering the Warrs to convey irrigation rights to all the plaintiffs. Id. at
747. The Warrs appealed several issues, the relevant issue for the instant case being
whether "the Lewises lacked privity of contract to sue the Warrs." Id. at 754.
The Warrs argued the quitclaim deed to the Lewises for the irrigation rights was
not an assignment, and therefore, the Lewises had no contractual claim against the Warrs.
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Id. The Lewises countered by arguing they "are successors to the Crittenden's claims
because the Crittendens, by quitclaim deed, conveyed all of their interests in the irrigation
water to the Lewises." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue and recognized that the
quitclaim deed assigned not only all water rights in the property, but any and all
contractual claims against the Warrs. Id. The court held, therefore, that "the Lewises
[were] entitled to bring against the Warrs any contractual action the Crittenden's [sic]
could have brought, including the instant claim for the irrigation water rights." Id. at 755
(emphasis added). In other words, the assignment put the Warrs and the Lewises in
privity of contract.
B.

Applying Spears to this Case, SEL Took All the Rights and Benefits SDC
Held Under the Contracts with RB&G—Including the Right to Sue for
Breach of Contract—and Nothing Less.

As applied to the instant case, Spears resolves the issue of whether SEL is in
privity with RB&G and whether SEL can recover damages for the lost revenue from the
lost fourteen units. Clearly, in light of Spears, SEL is privity with RB&G as a result of
SDC's assignment of "all of its rights and claims regarding the various engineering
reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals . . .." (R. at 393.) And just as in Spears,
SEL can bring any contractual action against RB&G that SDC could have brought,
Spears, 44 P.3d at 755, because SEL stands in the shoes of SDC subsequent to the
assignment.
In other words, in a legal sense, an assignment is of no consequence to the original
obligor on the contract; the original obligor's duties, rights, responsibilities, and liabilities
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remain unchanged regardless of an assignment. Id. Were it otherwise, an assignor's
assignment would vitiate the original obligor's duties, obligations, and liabilities under a
contract, leaving the assignee without the bargained-for rights and benefits under the
original terms of the contract. Thus, under RB&G's view of this issue, with each
assignment, an assignee would not receive 100% of the rights and benefits under the
assigned contract because the original obligor somehow would have shed some of its
obligations and liabilities pursuant to the assignment. This understanding of contract
assignment would not put the assignee in the shoes of the assignor, as intended, but
would re-draft the contract with each assignment, chipping away at the assignee's rights
each time.
Since assignment language in the quitclaim deed put the Warrs and the Lewises in
privity of contract, the Lewises could sue the Warrs for breach of contract. Similarly,
since the assignment from SDC to SEL of all SDC's "rights and claims regarding the
various engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals, etc." put SEL and
RB&G in privity of contract, SEL can sue RB&G for breach of contract.
Black's Law Dictionary also supports this position. Its defines "privity of
contract" as "[t]he relationship between the parties to a contract, allowing them to sue
each other but preventing a third party from doing so." Black's Law Dictionary 556 (2d
pocketed. 2001).
Therefore, since the assignment put SEL and RB&G in privity, any damages that
were SDC's became SEL's. Additionally, any damages subsequent to the assignment
remained with SEL. In either case, SEL could sue RB&G for breach of contract provided
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SEL could satisfy the elements for breach of contract.
C

RB&G Breached its 1993 and 1995 Contracts with SDC (and by Virtue of
the Assignment, with SEL).

From the time of the 1996 Property sale and assignment of rights from SDC to
SEL, SEL "owned" all of SDC's rights under SDCs various contracts with RB&G. In a
legal sense, the assignment made no difference from RB&G's perspective. It rights,
duties, obligations, and liabilities never changed. And once SEL discovered in 1998 that
RB&G breached its contract by, inter alia, failing to identify the faults on the Property, a
cause of action accrued. See, e.g., Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Utah 1993)
("A cause of action accrues when the last event necessary to complete the legal claim
occurs.'5).
Specifically, SEL discovered the breach in 1998 (after the 1996 assignment) when
Richard Giraud of the Utah Geological Survey sent the City of Provo a letter detailing the
discrepancies between RB&G's reports and the actual faults on the Property. (R. at 384.)
The Utah Geological Association ("UGA") then recommended additional testing, which
uncovered faults that RB&G missed in its 1993 and 1995 Reports. (R. at 384.) Based on
the UGA's discoveries, Provo City required, among other things, that certain fault setbacks be incorporated into the Property's design. (R. at 384.) Those set-backs ultimately
covered or infringed on the lost fourteen units. (R. at 384, 396.)
D.

RB&G's Breach Damaged SEL by Precluding SEL from Selling the Lost
14 Units.

As a result of the lost fourteen units, SEL lost the revenue those lots would have
generated, which amounts to $1,057,983.41. (R. at 396.) This constitutes part of SEL's
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and SDC's damages (since SEL, the Property's purchaser, was supposed to pay SDC for
the units once they sold). (R. at 396.)
Indeed, RB&G admitted its breach at the summary judgment hearing. RB&G, in
arguing SEL could not assert a breach of contract claim against RB&G, said "the
difference here, your Honor, is the contract was fully performed and breachedbefore the
assignment occurs." (R. at 744, p. 52 (emphasis added).) A moment later, he reiterated:
"so when [the contracts were] assigned, [they're] breached contract[s]." (R. at 744, p.
52 (emphasis added).)
Thus, all the elements of a breach of contract claim (a contract, performance by
the party seeking recovery, breach by the other party, and damages, see, e.g., Eleopulos v.
McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 145 P.3d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 2006)) are met in this case.
At the very minimum, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to SDC and SEL, there
exist issues of material facts that necessitate reversing the trial court's grant of RB&G's
motion for partial summary judgment.
IIL

THE SME INDUSTRIES CASE APPLIES, BUT THE TRIAL COURT AND
RB&G MISINTERPRETED AND MISTAKENLY RELIED UPON IT,
At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court and RB&G engaged in a lengthy

dialogue about privity of contract and how SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett,
Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 28 P.3d 669 (Utah 2001) applies to the instant case. (R. at
744, pp. 39-63.) This colloquy lasted for quite some time, and the trial court patiently
listened to RB&G's arguments that, based on SME, SEL and RB&G were not in privity
of contract (in spite of the assignment), and that as a result, SEL could not sue RB&G for
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breach of contract and thereby recover damages for the lost fourteen units. (R. at 744, pp.
39-63.)
After reading the hearing transcript, it is clear that RB&G's arguments
contradicted the court's intuition and understanding of contract assignment, and the court
repeatedly asked RB&G why the assignment failed to put SEL and RB&G in privity. (R.
at 744, pp.41-63.) RB&G incorrectly told the court that "[tjhat's exactly what the Utah
Supreme Court said in the SME case." (R. at 744, p. 41.)
SME does not stand for the proposition that SEL is not in privity with RB&G, or
that SEL cannot recover damages for breach of contract from RB&G, regardless of when
the breach occurred. Rather, SME supports SEL's position that SEL "stands in the
shoes" of SDC and can exercise SDC's universe of rights and benefits conferred upon it
by virtue of the contracts with RB&G.
A thorough review of the SME case is necessary before understanding how it
instructs this case.
A.

SME Industries,

In 1992, Salt Lake County ("SLCo.") entered into a contract for architectural
services with Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Associates, Inc. ("TVSA") to renovate
and expand the Salt Palace in Salt Lake City. SME Indus., 28 P.3d at 672. TVSA then
subcontracted with two other firms, Gillies, Stransky, Brems & Smith ("GSBS") and
Reaveley Engineers & Associates, Inc. ("Reaveley") (the three entities collectively
known as "the design team") that would provide engineering services, but those entities
did not directly contract with SLCo. Id. Thus, there was no privity between SLCo. and
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GSBS or SLCo. and Reaveley.
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y\

Reaveley

GSBS

Two years later, in 1994, independent from the SLCo-TVSA contract, SLCo.
contracted with Hughes-Hunt ("Hughes-Hunt") to act as the general contractor on the
project. Id. Hughes-Hunt then separately contracted with SME Industries, Inc. ("SME")
to furnish, fabricate, and erect the structural steel for the project. Id. Similar to GSBS
and Reaveley, SME did not directly contract with SLCo. Id. Thus, there was no privity
between SLCo. and SME.

CONTRACT

SLCo.

,

^

p

HUGHES- 1
HUNT
J

K

SME
Shortly after beginning work on the project, SME encountered problems with the
structural portions of the plans as prepared by the design team. Id. These problems led
to SME submitting numerous change orders. Id. As a result, SME incurred additional
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costs of more than $2 million, which SME submitted to Hughes-Hunt for payment. Id.
SME argued it was entitled to recover the costs because the design team was not timely in
responding to change order requests, and the design team's specifications often conflicted
with the plans for the project. Id. at 672-73. These problems delayed SME on this
project and other, unrelated projects as well. Id. at 673.
After receiving SME's invoice for $2 million, Hughes-Hunt forwarded it to
SLCo., which asked the design team to review it. Id. The design team recommended that
SLCo. reject the claim. Id. Nevertheless, SLCo. settled with Hughes-Hunt, paid HughesHunt $150,000, and assigned to Hughes-Hunt "all rights, causes of action, and claims
[SLCo.] had against the design team related to the structural steel portion of the project."
Id
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Subsequently, Hughes-Hunt settled with SME, whereby Hughes-Hunt paid SME
the $150,000 it received from SLCo. and "assign[ed] SME all of its direct and assigned
rights, causes of action, and claims against the design team." Id.
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Thereafter, SME filed suit against the design team: TVSA, GSBS, and Reaveley.
Id. The suit included the assigned claims that SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt had against the
design team. Id. SME's two relevant causes of action were breach of contract and
negligence against the design team. Id.
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B.

SME's Breach of Contract Claim Against the Design Team.

First, SME brought a breach of contract claim against the design team for a breach
of the SLCo.-TVSA contract. Id. at 674. This Court recognized that SME was not a
party to the SLCo.-TVSA contract and that SME was pursuing the claim pursuant to the
assignment from SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt. Id. The trial court concluded that SME's
breach of contract claim against the design team failed because an anti-assignment clause
in the SLCo.-TVSA contract prohibited the assignment by SLCo. to Hughes-Hunt, and
subsequently to SME, of a breach of contract cause of action against TVS A. Id. But this
Court rever4sed, stating that the anti-assignment clause did not specifically address
assignment of a cause of action seeking money damages for breach of contract after the
contract had been fully performed. Id. at 676.
The Court further stated in dicta that if the trial court determined the antiassignment clause did not prohibit SME from asserting a breach of contract claim against
the design team based on the assignment, then SME's damages would be limited to those
damages suffered by SLCo. Id. In other words, "SME may recover only what [SLCo.]
could recover from TVS A per the assignment." Id. The Court then quoted the oftrepeated maxim from American Jurisprudence that "the assignee is subject to any
defenses that would have been good against the [assignor]; the assignee cannot recover
more than the assignor could recover; and the assignee never stands in a better position
than the assignor." Id.
C.

SME's Damages Were Limited to $150,000 Because that is All SLCo. and
Hughes-Hunt Could Have Recovered from the Design Team, Since SLCo.
and Hughes-Hunt Both Settled for, and Suffered "Damages" of, $150,000.
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It is this last principle from American Jurisprudence that RB&G pounced upon in
the summary judgment hearing in arguing that SEL could not recover from RB&G for the
lost fourteen units. But at the hearing, RB&G omitted one crucial fact: SME's damages
were limited to those suffered by SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt (and the supreme court made
note of it) because SLCo, and Hughes-Hunt had already settled and, in so doing,
"suffered damages " to the tune of $150,000—no more, and no less.
Thus, the key distinction between SME and the instant case is this: in SME, each
assignor (SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt), in effect, capped the damages SME could recover
from the design team by settling and incurring "damages" in the amount of $ 150,000.
Put yet another way, SME could not recover more than $150,000 from the design team
because $150,000 is the amount SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt could have recovered from the
design team—nothing more.
Therefore, SEL does not take issue with the general proposition that an assignee
cannot recover more than the assignor could recover. But in the instant case, by virtue of
the privity between SEL and RB&G, and by virtue of the fact that there is no artificial
cap on SDC's damages, SEL can recover for the lost fourteen units. Any other
conclusion would sequester RB&G's liability for its conceded breach of the 1993 and
1995 contracts in a legal black hole, permitting no party to recover for the damages cause
by the breaches.
Moreover, SEL is not trying to recover more than SDC could have recovered.
SEL is trying to recover the same damages SDC would have recovered but for the
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assignment to SEL. RB&G should not be able to skirt liability for its breaches based on
its contrived reading of the SME case and based on the assignment to SEL.
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court misapplied the SME case,
thereby precluding SEL from recovering for RB&G's admitted breaches of the 1993 and
1995 contracts. Alternatively, at a minimum, there exist genuine issues of material facts
whether SEL can recover for the lost fourteen units based on RB&G's breach.
Regardless, this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment.
IV.

A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION ACCRUES UPON THE BREACH,
NOT UPON DAMAGE, THUS, SDC ASSIGNED A COMPLETED
BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION TO SEL.
A breach of contract cause of action accrues upon the breach, not at the time of

damage. Therefore, SDC assigned a valid, completed breach of contract cause of action
to SEL in 1996.6 Therefore, SEL can properly assert its breach of contract cause of
action against RB&G for the lost fourteen units, which would have been SDC's damages.
A breach of contract requires four essential elements of proof: "(1) a contract, (2)
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of contract by the other party, and
(4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001).
Generally, a cause of action "accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins
to run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action."

6

RB&G may argue, under Wiscombe v. Lockhart Co., 608 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah
1980), that an assignee's rights are limited when the assignor assigns only u a portion of
its rights under the contract. . . ." But it is undisputed that in this case, SDC assigned
all—not just a portion—of its rights under its contracts with RB&G to SEL. (R. at 393.)
Indeed, subsequent to the assignment, SDC was no longer a party to the RB&G contract,
and SDC wholly terminated its privity with RB&G.
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Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 114 P.3d 602, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). But this is not
the case with a cause of action for breach of contract: "a contract action ordinarily
accrues at the time of breach." S & G Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735,
740 (Utah 1996); see also Clarke, 114 P.3d at 603 (holding that a breach of contract
cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time of the
breach).
The breach of contract actions against RB&G accrued in 1993 and 1995 when
RB&G failed to identify the existing faults on the development.7 Thus, at those
moments, SDC could assert breach of contract actions against RB&G for damages,
although the damages were yet undiscovered (hence the delay in asserting the claim and
the reason for applying the "discovery rule," discussed infra).
Therefore, when SDC transferred to SEL all of SDC's interest in the two contracts
with RB&G, SEL could (as the assignee and successor-in-interest) assert the breach of
contract actions against RB&G that SDC could have asserted.
V.

SINCE SDC/SEL DID NOT DISCOVER—AND COULD NOT HAVE
REASONABLY DISCOVERED—RB&G'S BREACHES UNTIL YEARS
LATER, THE COURT SHOULD APPLY THE "DISCOVERY RULE" TO
TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
By RB&G's own admission, RB&G breached the contracts with SDC before the

assignment. But SDC did not immediately bring suit upon discovery of the breaches
7

Importantly, RB&G admitted it breached the contracts with SDC. At the
summary judgment hearing, in arguing that SEL could not assert a breach of contract
claim against RB&G, its counsel said "the difference here, your Honor, is the contract
was fully performed and breached before the assignment occurs." (R. at 744, p.52
(emphasis added).) A moment later, he reiterated, "so when [the contracts were]
assigned, [they're] breached contract[s]. " (R. at 744, p. 52 (emphasis added).)
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because it did not know about the breaches until 1998 when the Utah Geological Survey
("UGS") notified the assignee, SEL, of existing faults under the property which
necessitated a re-design and which results in the lost fourteen units. Further, neither SDC
or SEL could have known about the faults until UGS notified them. In fact, SDC
specifically contracted with and relied on RB&G to discover any faults and to avoid this
kind of costly surprise. The Court should apply the "discovery rule" to toll the statute of
limitations, making SDC/SEL's claims timely filed.
As noted above, a cause of action generally accrues "'upon the happening of the
last event necessary to complete the cause of action.'" Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 1275
(Utah 2001) (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)); see also Olsen
v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Utah 1993) (stating that a limitations period "begins to
run when the cause of action accrues"). This rule is different for contract actions,
however, with accrual of the action upon the breach. S & G Inc., 913 P.2d at 740.
Therefore, since the statute of limitations for suit upon a written contract is six years,
Utah Code Ann. sec. 78B-2-309(2), the statute of limitations would have expired by the
time SDC/SEL filed their claims in 2003.
But as with most rules of law, "[t]here are a number of exceptions to this general
rule [that a statute of limitations begins to run when the action accrues]." Myers, 635 P.2d
at 86. One such exception is the "discovery rule," which "toll[s] the limitations period
'until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.5" Hill, 25 P.3d at
1275 (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86). In other words, applying the discovery rule
prevents the limitations period from beginning to run "until the facts forming the
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foundation for the cause of action are discovered." Hill, 25 P.3d at 1275 (emphasis
added); see also Olsen, 865 P.2d at 1348 ("Under the discovery rule, a statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff learns of, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have learned of, the facts that give rise to the cause of
action.").
There are two types of discovery rules: a "statutory discovery rule" and an
"equitable discovery rule," Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 562, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), the
latter of which applies in this case. The "equitable discovery rule" applies in two
situations:
(1) where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because
of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct, and
(2) where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of
the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing
that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.
Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 135 P.3d 904, 910 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted).
This case justifies applying the second rationale of the equitable discovery rule.
SDC hired RB&G to perform not one, but two, esoteric, technical, and scientific analyses
of the development to determine whether there were geologic faults that would affect the
design of and construction on the property. RB&G issued the reports, and SDC (and
subsequently SEL) relied upon them. Indeed, SDC specifically procured geotechnical
reports from RB&G to avoid any surprises once design and construction began. Yet in
1998, three years after RB&G's final report, UGS notified SEL of the faults that existed
on the property and that SEL had to complete a re-design to compensate for the existing
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faults. This re-design resulted in the lost fourteen units and a loss of more than a million
dollars for SDC/SEL.
If the Court refuses to apply the equitable discovery rule in this case, it would
work an injustice on SDC and SEL. They had no reason to know of, and had no ability to
discover, RB&G's breaches and the damages therefrom until UGS notified SEL in 1998
of the faults that RB&G had missed. Indeed, SDC contracted with RB&G precisely to
avoid this kind of costly surprise.
The lost fourteen units are a "latent injury," as discussed in Christiansen v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., where this Court applied the discovery rule to toll a statute of limitations
period when the plaintiff did not know or have reason to know "of the existence and
cause of the injury which is the basis of his action." 136 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Utah 2006).
Just as in Christiansen, SDC and SEL did not know, and had no reason to know, of the
existence of the cause of injury (or the injury itself) until 1998. Thus, the Court should
apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations in this case.
Moreover, in Myers, the Utah Supreme Court applied the discovery rule to toll a
statute of limitations because "the plaintiffs were unaware of the facts giving rise to their
cause of action." Myers, 635 P.2d at 87. Similarly, in this case, neither SDC nor SEL
was aware of RB&G's breaches until UGS informed SEL in 1998 of the faults on the
property that RB&G missed, which resulted in the lost fourteen units. Everything to
satisfy a cause of action had occurred—it was just a question of when SDC/SEL
discovered it. Or, as this Court stated in Myers, the Court should apply the discovery rule
and toll the statute of limitations because "[SDC/SEL] were unaware of the facts giving
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rise to their cause of action." Therefore, the statute of limitations should not have begun
until SEL learned of RB&G's breaches in 1998 from UGS.
The Olsen case clearly establishes that "a statute of limitations does not begin to
run until the plaintiff learns of, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
learned of, the facts that give rise to the cause of action." 865 P.2d at 1348. Since
neither SDC nor SEL learned of (or could have learned of) RB&G's breaches until UGS
notified SEL in 1998 of the existing faults, the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until then. Thus, SEL's breach of contract claim was timely filed.
VL

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THE COURT FINDS NO PRIVITY
BETWEEN SEL AND RB&G, THEN SDC REMAINS IN PRIVITY WITH
RB&G, AND SDC CAN RECOVER ITS DAMAGES AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF RB&G'S BREACHES.
In the event the Court finds that SEL and RB&G are not in privity of contract,

then by logical conclusion, SDC remains in privity of contract with RB&G. And as a
result, SDC would be entitled to consequential damages flowing from RB&G's breaches
of the 1993 and 1995 contracts.
In any event, whether SDC is in privity of contract, and thereby entitled to
consequential damages pursuant to RB&G's breaches, is a disputed genuine issue of
material fact necessitating reversing the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment.
VII.

EVEN IF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE APPLIES TO SDC'S
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM, RB&G HAS AN INDEPENDENT DUTY, AS A
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING FIRM, TO PERFORM
COMPETENTLY AND THOROUGHLY, THUS EXCEPTING SDC'S
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS FROM THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE.
Even if the Court affirms the trial court's application of the economic loss rule to
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SDC's negligence claim against RB&G, SDC should nonetheless be able to maintain its
negligence claim against RB&G. Since RB&G is a professional engineering firm, it has
an independent duty to perform competently, professional, and thoroughly, knowing
others will rely, to their detriment, upon its analyses and conclusions. If those analyses
and conclusions are incorrect due to the engineer's negligence, the party relying thereon
will suffer dire economic and non-economic harm—just as SDC and SEL did in this case.
RB&G could foresee economic harm to SEC (in terms of delays, demolition, reconstruction, and re-design) if RB&G negligently performed its geologic studies. This
foreseeabihty is the very essence of tort liability, and it pushes RB&G's liability into tort
doctrines and outside of the economic loss rule.
A.

SDC Lost its Privity of Contract with RB&G when SDC Assigned its
Rights Under the 1993 and 1995 Contracts to SEL in 1996.

Initially, SDC contracted with RB&G for RB&G to perform geologic analyses of
the Property. (R. at 392-93.) But when SDC assigned its rights under those contracts to
SEL in 1996, SDC lost its privity of contract with RB&G; SEL gained it. (R. at 393.) It
cannot be disputed that SDC relinquished all its rights under the 1993 and 1995 contracts
to SEL (r. at 393), thus endowing SEL with those rights.
As a result, SDC was left as a third party, with no privity of contract with RB&G.
This is a crucial point because SDC now moves this Court to find an independent tort
duty for professional engineers that exempts them from the economic loss rule to the
extent they are not in privity of contract with the injured party. Thus, SDC appeals the
dismissal of its negligence claim against RB&G. Conversely, since SEL is in privity of
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contract with RB&G, SEL does not appeal the dismissal of its negligence claims against
RB&G, as SEL and RB&G were in a position to allocate risk and damages by contract
(by virtue of the assignment).
R

The Economic Loss Rule Prevents a Recovery of Economic Damages
Based on a Theory of Unintentional Tort, but when an Independent Duty
Applies to the Tortfeasor, the Economic Loss Rule Does Not Preclude
Recovery of Economic Damages.

It is well-settled that the economic loss rule "prevents a party from claiming
economic damages in negligence absent physical property damage or bodily injury."
West v. Inter-Financial Inc., 139 P.3d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (citation and
quotations omitted).
But equally prominent is the principle that where an "independent duty exists, the
economic loss rule does not bar a tort claim because the claim is based on a recognized
independent duty of case and thus does not fall within the scope of the rule." Id. at 1062
(citation and quotations omitted).
C.

It Is an Open Question Whether Other Professionals Owe Their Clients an
Independent Tort Duty.

In SME, although the Utah Supreme Court applied the economic loss rule to bar a
contractor's or subcontractor's negligence claim against a design professional, the court
left the door open to find an independent tort duty vis-a-vis other professionals: "the issue
of whether the economic loss rule bars claims against other professionals, such as lawyers
and accountants, is not before us, and we do not decide it." SME Indus., 28 P.3d at 682
n.9.
Indeed, the supreme court's application of the economic loss rule in SME was
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logical and consistent with the rational behind the economic loss rule. See, e.g., West,
139 P.3d at 1062 (reasoning that Utah courts generally apply the economic loss rule
where parties can avoid their economic loss "with contracts and are thus free to adjust
their respective obligations to satisfy their mutual expectations. . . . [RJelief for defeated
economic expectations . .. was to come from the contract itself.. ." (citations and
quotations omitted)). A building contractor and an architect are construction-savvy
entities, and they would scarcely (if ever) work together on a development sans contract.
Therefore, since a contractor and an architect can and do bargain for their rights and
remedies, and would scarcely perform otherwise, the supreme court appropriately applied
the economic loss rule to bar negligence claims by a contractor against a design
professional.
In the instant case, however, SDC relied upon RB&G to accurately and
competently perform its analyses, the failure of which led to enormous financial loss for
SDC Since SDC lost its privity with RB&G pursuant to the 1996 assignment, SDC
should now be able to assert its negligence claim against RB&G based on RB&G's
esoteric knowledge and experience, the information asymmetry between SDCand RB&G,
and SDC's reliance upon RB&G for a professional, complete, accurate analysis of the
Property.
D.

This Court Can Properly Address Common Law Issues and Make Policy
Judgments "To Get the Law Right/' As Evidenced By the Utah Supreme
Court in Yazd v. Woodside Homes.

Admittedly, "courts [typically] cede authority over matters of policy to the
political branches of the government." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 143 P.3d 283,
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287 (Utah 2006). But when policy considerations "bear on a subject lodged firmly within
the court's sphere, like the common law, it is entirely appropriate for the court to make
policy judgments necessary to get the law right." Id.
The question whether professional engineers owe an independent tort duty to their
clients is squarely within this Court's sphere, precisely as whether builder-contractors
owed an independent duty to their customers was within the supreme court's sphere in
Yazd. Thus, this Court can appropriately and timely speak to this issue.
E.

Professional Engineers have an Independent Duty Based on a "Special
Relationship" with their Clients Stemming from Information Asymmetry,
Engineers' Esoteric Knowledge and Expertise, and their Clients' Reliance
Thereon.

Legal duty is a product "of policy judgments applied to relationships." Yazd, 143
P.3d at 286; see also Webb v. University of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (Utah 2005) ("Duty
arises out of the relationship between the parties and imposes a legal obligation on one
party for the benefit of the other party."). Whether one party owes another party a legal
duty is a function of "[a]ge, knowledge, influence, bargaining power, sophistication, and
cognitive ability," among other factors. Yazd, 143 P.3d at 286. When there is a disparity
in "one or more of these circumstances," the balance in the parties' relationship becomes
distorted "to the degree that one party is exposed to unreasonable risk," justifying "the
law['s] intervene[tion] by creating a duty on the advantaged party to conduct itself in a
manner that does not reward exploitation of its advantage" Id. (emphasis added).
But simply because one party possesses "important, even vital" information does
not mean that party has a legal duty to another absent some relationship between the
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parties. Id. at 287. An example of this is the "special relationship" doctrine in tort law.
Id. "A person has no legal duty to protect another person from the conduct of a stranger
unless the person upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed has a 'special relationship'
with either the stranger or the potential victim." Id:, see also Gilger v. Hernandez, 997
P.2d 305, 310 (Utah 2000) ("a person has no affirmative duty . . . to protect another from
harm" unless the person "upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed" has a special
relationship with either the person causing the harm or the injured person). Thus, in the
context of ordinary negligence actions, "a special relationship is what is required to give
rise to a duty to act. .. ." Webb, 125 P.3d at 910.
The essence of a "special relationship" is "dependence by one party upon the other
. . . . " Webb, 125 P.3d at 909. The Utah Supreme Court, quoting Black's Law
Dictionary, also noted that a "special relationship" is "[a] nonfiduciary relationship
having an element of trust, arising especially] when one person trusts another to exercise
a reasonable degree of care . .. ." Webb, 125 P.3d at 909-10 (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 1405 (7th ed. 1999) (first alteration in original)).
Utah courts have found that typically, although not always, parties subject to a
"special relationship" do not allocate their risk with contracts. West, 139 P.3d at 1064.
In one particular case, the Utah Supreme Court found a "special relationship" between an
accountant and a third party despite the lack of contractual privity, thereby subjecting the
accountant to economic damage in spite of the economic loss rule. Milliner v. Elmer Fox
& Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). The supreme court went on to hold that a third party
could maintain a negligence action against an accountant where the third party relied on
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the accountant's report and where the accountant knew that the party would rely on the
report for a particular purpose. Id. at 808. Speaking to privity between the parties, the
court clarified that "lack of privity is not a defense where an accountant... is aware of
the fact that his work will be relied on by a party or parties . . . ." Id.
Milliner is particularly instructive in the instant case because the accountant knew
the party would rely upon his report, just as in our case, RB&G knew SDC and/or SEL
would rely upon RB&G's two reports. And privity or not (although SDC. does not ask
this Court to permit tort recovery when an engineer is in privity with the injured party),
the Utah Supreme Court suggests that where a professional knows that a party—even a
third party, in Milliner's case—will rely upon the professional's report for a particular
purpose, that party can assert a negligence claim against the professional because a
"special relationship" exists.
Utah courts have found a "special relationship" between other parties as well. For
example, as mentioned above, there is a "special relationship" between builderdevelopers and their customers, even though those parties typically allocate their risk by
contract. Yazd, 143 P.3d at 287. Additionally, Utah courts found a "special relationship"
between surveyor and third parties, despite lack of privity of contract. Price-Orem
Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986).8
And in Hermansen v. Tasulis, the Utah Supreme Court found a special relationship
8

Coincidentally, RB&G was a defendant in the Price-Orem case as well (there
styled as "Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc."), wherein RB&G also argued that based on a
lack of contractual privity, it could not be liable for its negligence. Especially in light of
that case, RB&G should be well aware of its duties and obligations to those who rely
upon its analyses and reports.
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between real estate brokers and their clients. 48 P.3d 235, 241 (Utah 2002). In finding
the "special relationship" in Hermansen, the court reasoned that a real estate agent owes a
duty, independent of any express or implied contract, "to be honest, ethical, and
competent" in his or her relationship with the client. Id. Real estate professionals cannot,
the court held, breach their duty to be competent, and not be liable for their actions. Id.
Similarly, engineering professionals occupy a comparable status in their industry.
Companies and individuals wholly rely upon engineering professionals to provide
accurate, complete, competent advice and reports. To the extent engineering
professionals fail that standard, they must be held accountable for the consequences.
There is a real possibility that an engineering professional, like RB&G, could negligently
performs its duty by, for example, failing to identify faults, leading to considerable
damage in the form of substantial economic and non-economic losses. Yet the
engineering professional would be liability-proof; the damaged party could not recover
any money damages in spite of the engineer's negligence and breach. The instant case is
evidence of this very scenario.
One unique feature of professional engineers that gives rise to an independent
duty—especially prominent in the instant case—is the foreseeability they have with
respect to damages should they negligently perform their duties. In other words,
engineers can foresee that their clients will suffer Herculean financial harm if the
engineers' tests, analyses, and reports are flawed due to negligence on the engineers' part.
As engineers are often involved at the beginning of a development, as RB&G was here,
the engineers know their clients rely upon them for professional, competent advice with
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respect to development design and construction. If the engineers are negligent, they
know their clients will suffer the financial consequences.
Therefore, professional engineers owe their clients an independent duty to perform
competently, thoroughly, and professionally. Anything less and engineers can escape
liability, as RB&G has nearly done in this case.
F.

The Economic Loss Rule, While Valuable, Is Limited in its Application,
Lest the Rule Swallow Tort Law Entirely.

As Justice Bradley of the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently noted, the economic
loss rule is "'the ever-expanding, all-consuming alien life form portrayed in the 1958 Bmovie classic The Blob"' and is '"a swelling globule on the legal landscape . . . . ' " 1325
N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 841 (Wis. 2006) (Bradley, J.
dissenting) (quoting Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 180 (Wis. 2005)).
Although useful in limited contexts, this Court should take appropriate steps to limit its
application so as to prevent the rule from swallowing legitimate causes of action and
recovery in tort.
The Florida Supreme Court sagely addressed the limited applicability and use of
the economic loss rule, as it is a potent doctrine that effectively bars otherwise valid
causes of action.
In Moransais v. Heathman, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that although
"the economic loss rule may have some genuine, but limited value in . . . damages law,
we never intended to bar well-established common law causes of action, such as those for
neglect in providing professional services'' 1AA So. 2d 973, 983 (Fla. 1999) (emphasis
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added). Rather, as the court noted, the rule was originally intended to limit causes of
action in the product liability context, thus, the rule's application "should generally be
limited to those contexts or situations where the policy considerations are substantially
identical to those underlying the product liability-type analysis," id., such as the builderdeveloper exception the Utah Supreme Court adopted in Yazd.
Speaking more directly to negligence causes of action against "professionals," the
court went on to clarify that since such actions "often involve purely economic loss
without any accompanying personal injury or property damage, extending the economic
loss rule to these cases would effectively extinguish such causes of action." Id.; see also
Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster That Ate Commercial
Torts, Fla. B J. 34, 40 (Nov. 1995) ("[I]f the doctrine were genuinely applied to bar all
tort claims for economic losses without accompanying personal injury or property
damage, the rule would wreak havoc on the common law of torts."); Blanche M.
Manning, Legal Malpractice: Is it Tort or Contract?, 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 741, 742
(1990) ("Because attorney malpractice rarely results in personal injury or property
damage, the damages plaintiffs seek most often in malpractice claims against attorneys
are for economic or pecuniary losses allegedly caused by the attorney's failure to exercise
adequate care."). Surely this cannot be what Utah courts have in mind for the economic
loss rule in Utah.
The Florida Supreme Court has the right analysis. Since professionals' negligence
often results only in economic loss without accompanying personal injury or property
damage, extending the economic loss rule to negligence actions against professional
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engineers would extinguish recovery for professional engineers' negligence. This Court
should refuse to allow professional engineers that engage in negligence from answering
for their negligence.
G.

Other Jurisdictions Have Recognized the Limits of the Economic Loss Rule
By Applying the "Special Relationship" Exception to Professional
Engineers like RB&G, as Well as Other Professionals.

Nineteen other jurisdictions have persuasively exempted professionals—
commonly engineers, architects, and design professionals—from the protection of the
economic loss rule based on the professionals' foreseeability of the damages and on the
injured party's reliance on the professional's expertise and knowledge, about which the
professional is aware. These jurisdictions include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas,
and Washington.9

9

See, e.g., Owen v. Dodd, 431 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (contractor may
recover against architect); Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc,
Inc., 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (subcontractor may recover against
engineer); Detweiler Bros., Inc. v. John Graham & Co., All F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Wash.
1976) (subcontractor may recover against architect); United States ex rel Los Angeles
Testing Laboratory v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (contractor
may recover against architect); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973)
(contractor may recover against architect or engineer); Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v.
Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1984) (subcontractor may recover against
architect); Donnelly Const. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984)
(architect liable on negligence theory to contractor for increased cost of construction due
to error in plans and specifications); Carroll-Boone Water Dist. v. M & P Equip. Co., 661
S.W.2d 345 (Ark. 1983) (contractor may recover against engineer); Wolther v.
Schaarschmidt, 738 P.2d 25 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (purchaser of home may recover
against engineer); Guardian Const, v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378 (Del.
Super. 1990) (lack of contractual privity between design engineer and general contractor
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In fact, since the 1990s, courts are increasingly limiting the application of the
economic loss rule against professionals, frequently engineers, for professional
negligence. For example:
•

In Lyndon Prop. Ins. Co. v. Duke Levy & Assoc, LLC, 475 F.3d 268 (5th Cir.
2007), the Fifth Circuit, applying Mississippi law, held that an engineer could be
held liable in negligence in spite of a governing contract between the parties. The
court declined to apply the economic loss rule.

•

In Farmers Alliance Mutual Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (D. N.M.
2006), the U.S. District Court in New Mexico held that the economic loss rule
does not bar tort claims arising from an independent duty of care, specifically, a

was not fatal to negligence and negligence misrepresentation claims against design
engineer, notwithstanding fact that contractor and subcontractor were seeking purely
economic damages); Normoyle-Berg & Assoc, Inc. v. Village of Deer Creek, 350 N.E.2d
559 (111. Ct. App. 1976) (contractor may recover against engineer); Gurtler, Hebert &
Co., Inc. v. WeylandMachine Shop, Inc., 405 So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1981)
(subcontractor may assert third-party claim against architect); Craig v. Everett M. Brooks
Co., 222 N.E.2d 752 (Mass. 1967) (contractor may recover against engineer); Natl Sand,
Inc. v. Nagel Constr., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 618 (Mich. 1990) (subcontractor may maintain
action against engineers); Bacco Const. Co. v. American Colloid Co., 384 N.W.2d 427
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (contractor may recover against engineer); Magnolia Constr. Co.
v. Mississippi Gulf South Eng'rs, Inc., 518 S. 2d 1194 (Miss. 1988) (architect owes duty
to contractor); Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C Morris Assoc, 418 A.2d 1290 (N.J.
Super. 1980), affd, 489 A.2d 1233 (N.J. Super. 1985) (contractor may recover against
design professional); Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson,
539 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1989) (owner may recover against consulting engineer); Shoffner
Indust, Inc. v. W.B. Lloyd Const. Co., 257 S.E.2d 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (contractor
may recover against architect); Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. New Hanover County, 255
S.E.2d 580 (N.C. Ct App. 1979) (architect, in absence of privity of contract, may be sued
by general contractor or subcontractor for economic loss foreseeably resulting from
architect's breach of duty of due care in performance of contract with owner); Forte
Bros, Inc. v. Natl Amusement, Inc., 525 A.2d 1301 (R.I. 1987) (contractor may recover
against architect); Associated Architects & Eng'rs, Inc. v. Lubbock Glass & Mirror Co.,
Ml S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (subcontractor may recover against architect).
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negligence claim for professional negligence. That court relied in part upon the
Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Hermansen, that where an independent duty
exists, the economic loss rule does not fall within the scope of the rule. Id. at
1174.
•

In Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 591 (W. Va. 2000), the Supreme Court of
West Virginia, although applying the economic loss rule, went on to state that a
tortfeasor may be held liable "where a special and narrowly defined relationship
can be established between the tortfeasor and the plaintiff who was deprived of an
economic benefit.. ." (emphasis added). Such cases would involve the
tortfeasor's foreseeability that economic losses would result from the tortfeasor's
negligence. Id.

• In Moransais v. Heathman, 1AA So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court
held that a party could maintain a negligence claim against engineers who failed to
detect and disclose certain defects in the property. The court declined to apply the
economic loss rule.
•

In Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc.,
463 S.E.2d 85 (S.C. 1995), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a
contractor could maintain suit in tort for purely economic losses because the
engineer owed the contractor a duty not to negligently design or negligently
supervise the project. The court declined to apply the economic loss rule.

•

In John Martin Co., Inc. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1991), the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that a subcontractor, despite lack of privity, could
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make a claim against the construction manager based upon negligence. The court
declined to apply the economic loss rule.
•

In City of Cairo v. Hightower Consulting Engrs, Inc., 629 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2006), the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the economic loss rule did not
bar an injured party from recovering economic damages from an engineering firm
for negligence.

•

In Best Friends Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc., No. X06CV000169755S,
2003 WL 22962147, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2003) {off d by Best Friends
Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc., 823 A.2d 329 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)), the
Superior Court of Connecticut held that the economic loss rule did not bar a
negligence claim against an engineering firm. (A copy of this decision is attached
hereto as Addendum 5.)

•

In Nestlenook, Inc. v. Atlantic Design Eng 'rs, No CA 01 -0154A, 2003 WL
22670881, at *2 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Oct 22, 2003), the Superior Court of
Massachusetts held that a negligence claim against an engineer was viable because
the engineer "knew [the injured party] would be relying on [the engineer's
knowledge and expertise in staking property]." The court declined to apply the
economic loss rule. (A copy of this decision is attached hereto as Addendum 6.)
As the Court can see, jurisdictions around the country are increasingly limiting the

application of the economic loss rule to professionals, especially engineers, because
plaintiffs so wholly rely upon engineers' expertise and knowledge in planning and
developing property, whether a single home or an enormous planned community.
48

Engineers' knowledge, expertise, and information asymmetry give rise to this
independent duty. Utah should follow its sister jurisdictions and adopt this duty.
"A court's conclusion that duty does or does not exist is can expression of the sum
total of those consideration of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is [or is
not] entitled to protection.'" Webb, 125 P.3d at 909 (quoting Univ. of Denver v.
Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57 (Colo. 1987)). This Court should protect individuals and
entities from negligence by professional engineers.
The Court should find professional engineers have an independent duty to their
clients to perform with the skill, precision, and knowledge their clients expect and the law
demands.
VIII. EQUITY DEMANDS THAT RB&G BE HELD LIABLE FOR ITS
CONCEDED BREACHES OF THE 1993 AND 1995 CONTRACTS.
Based on principles of equity, the Court should not allow RB&G to escape
liability for its negligence and admitted breaches. It must be liable for the consequences
of its actions.
Utah courts, "in light of [their] plenary powers in administering law and equity,
can make such orders as are necessary and expedient in order to do justice between the
parties as the particular circumstances warrant." Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah
1973).
In most cases before this Court, "fairness" and "equity" are loose concepts,
ambiguous because they rarely apply to dispositively affect the disposition of a case. But
occasionally, a case comes along where the principles of equity are truly, undeniably
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stacked in one party's favor. This is such a case.
If the Court (1) does not find SEL in privity with RB&G, and (2) applies the
economic loss rule to preclude SDC's negligence claim, and (3) fails to adopt an
independent duty for professional engineers, RB&G is liability proof. No party can
recover for RB&G's conceded breached which caused more than $1 million in damages.
SDC and SEL must absorb that entire liability. This contravenes all the principles of the
law and equity.
The three goals of tort law are deterrence, retribution, and compensation.
Permitting RB&G to escape liability for its breaches contravenes all three goals. It does
not deter others from being negligent; it does not punish RB&G for its negligence; it does
not reimburse or compensate SDC and SEL for their losses.
Based on the Court's inherent, broad powers of equity and fairness, the Court
should preclude RB&G from escaping liability by allowing SDC to recover under its
negligence claim and by allowing SEL to assert its breach of contract claim to recover for
the lost fourteen units.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant
of partial summary judgment in RB&G's favor and remand this case back to the trial
court.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of June 2008.

HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.

JM
Stephen Quesenberry
Charles L. Perschon
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of June 2008, two true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONERS were hand-delivered to the following:
MR. CRAIG C. COBURN
MR. LINCOLN HARRIS
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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SUNRIDGE DEVELOPMENT
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RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
Case # 030400328

vs.

Judge Fred D. Howard

RB&G ENGINEERING, INC.,

Division 5
Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motionfor Partial Summary Judgment,
The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the
following:
Ruling
Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with the Court on March 9,
2005, asserting that SDC's and SEL's negligence claims are barred as a matter of law by Utah's
economic loss rule. Defendant contends that only SDC's claim for breach of contract remains.
Plaintiffs assert that most of its damages are recoverable or that the amount of damages are at
least in dispute and that Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment "shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The Utah Supreme Court, in National

American Life Insurance Company v. Bayou Country Club, Inc., 403 P.2d 26 (Utah 1965), stated
that summary judgment rules "should be liberally interpreted to effectuate their purpose, to effect
the prompt administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials where
no triable issue of fact is disclosed." Id. at 29 (citations omitted). The purpose of summary
judgment is to "provide a means of searching out the undisputed facts" to find if the matter can
be resolved as a matter of law, thereby conserving both party and court resources. Rich v.
McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266,1267-68 (Utah 1976).
The Court first finds that there are no material issues of fact and that the issues before
the Court can be resolved as a matter of law.
The Court is unpersuaded that SDC and SEL can maintain their independent negligence
claims. The Court notes that "the economic loss rule holds that 'economic losses are not
recoverable in negligence absent physical damage or bodily injury.'" SME Industries, Inc V.
Thompson, Ventuleet, Stainback and Associates, Inc., 2001 UT 54, \ 35, 28 P.3d 669. The
Court, therefore, for the reasons stated in Defendant's memoranda, finds that SDC's and SEL's
negligence claims are barred by the economic loss rule.
The next issue before the Court is whether the economic loss rule limits Plaintiffs'
damages. Defendant asserts that SME Industries is controlling and directly on point in this
matter and that SEL must stand in the shoes of SDC and can only recover damages that SDC is
entitled to. Plaintiffs asserts that SEL is in privity with Defendant and that SEL may seek its own
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damages from Defendant. Seemingly, under general theories of contract law, one might suggest
that SEL may recover its damages which were incurred due to Defendant's breach of contract
with SDC. However, the Court notes SME Industries, which was determined in hindsight and is
controlling, stands for the rule that an assignee stands in the shoes of an assignor and that the
assignee never stands in a better position than the assignor. SME Industries, 28 P.3d at 676.
Under SME Industries, SEL may only pursue SDC's claims and remedies against Defendant.
In this case, SDC and SEL have characterized their damages respectively. Under SME
Industries, SEL's damages are limited by that characterization. Accordingly, SEL only has a
claim for damages incurred by SDC1,
In summary, the Court grants Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.
Counsel for Defendant is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling.

1

The Court notes that SEL's damages do not appear to be
consequential damages. The facts do not illustrate that SEL
bought the property at an increased price based on unit value.
There was no showing that SEL suffered any loss of actual value
regarding the entire property due to the loss of the 14 units as
a result of Defendant's alleged breach. Moreover, Plaintiffs
generalized the development process and have not distinguished
when Plaintiffs were on notice of Defendant's breach. As a
consequence, many of Plaintiffs' alleged damages are not
consequential damages.
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Dated this y y ^ d a y of August, 2005.
BY THE COURT:
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

SUMUDGE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, e t a L ,
Plaintiffs,

Case # 030400328

vs.

Judge Fred D. Howard

RB&G ENGINEERING, INC.

Division 5
Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following:
Ruling
Defendant filed its most recent Motion for Summary Judgment with the Court on July 26,
2006 alleging that the Plaintiff has failed to establish & prima facie case relative to its breach of
contract claims. Specifically, the Defendant claims the Plaintiff failed to produce evidence (beyond
a generalized summary produced for this litigation) of the some $388,820.21 it claims in damages,
save for the claim relative to the trenching and backfill studies in the amount of $22,207.50 .
Plaintiff argues that it has produced additional evidence beyond the generalized summary
to substantiate its damage claims. The Plaintiff acknowledges that this evidence is only now
forthcoming in the form of affidavits, but argues that admission of the evidence does not prejudice
the Defendant, and is appropriate in the interest ofjustice and fairness. The Defendant has countered

that admissi on of this new evidence is not timely, and should have been provided prior to the August
1, 2006 deadline to file any dispositive motion.
The Court notes that this case was initially filed by the Plaintiff on January 23,2003. The
Court also notes that once a case enters the discovery process both parties have an obligation under
Ut. R. Civ. Pro. 26(a)(1) to make evidentiary disclosures to one another. That is an obligation
imposed by Rule 26, it is not an obligation that arises once the opposing party requests certain
information, nor does it arise in connection with a court's scheduling order, or an order compelling
discovery (though all these things may take place during the discovery process). It is an affirmative
obligation on the part of attorneys to share relevant information at the initial stages of litigation. The
rule is designed to streamline the litigation process and, at an early stage, bring to light all relevant
information that will form the foundation of the parties' legal theories, frame the issues for trial, or,
potentially, lead to a less costly settlement.
The Plaintiff requests that this Court, in essence, place the substance of the case above
procedure, ignore Plaintiffs failure to produce its evidence timely, and proceed to trial. The Court
notes, however, that what the Plaintiff casts as "procedure" is really the Defendant's substantive right
to rely upon the record after the close of discovery and move for summary judgment to avoid the
time and expense of trial on a claim not supported by the evidence. The Utah Supreme Court has
recently held that reliance upon the rules is more than a mere formality stating: "the rules provide
the source of available relief. They are designed to provide a pattern of regularity of procedure
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which the parties and the courts can follow and rely upon." State v. Ison, 135 P.3d 861, 863 (Utah
2006), quoting Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah 1966) (internal citations omitted).
There may have been a day when parties could withhold information from one another
under the notion that the other side had not requested it, but, under the current rules an attorney has
an affirmative obligation to disclose, and to disclose timely. Rule 26 is an important part of Utah's
civil pre-trial process, and is designed to bring a transparency to litigation that serves the interests
of fairness and justice. It seems implausible to this Court that both the letter, and the spirit, of the
rule has been observed by a Plaintiff which files suit in 2003, and then, nearly four years later offers
what may be germane evidence only in response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court notes that it did not impose a discovery deadline in this case. The Defendant
has pointed out, and this Court was given to understand, that both parties represented to the Court
that discovery was complete in this case during a telephone scheduling conference on February 3,
2006. Based on that understanding the Court set August 1, 2006 as the deadline by which both
parties must file all dispositive motions, if any.
Given this case history, the August 1,2006 deadline presupposes an end to the discovery
process. By its order, the Court has directed that the attorneys can assume and evaluate the evidence
which has been discovered in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and if they choose,
make an assessment of the strength of a party's legal position. Such an assessment could not be
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made as directed by the Court if the evidentiary landscape is ever-changing1. Therefore, Plaintiff
may not "sit" on evidence whether intentional, or by oversight, while the Defendant complies with
the Court's imposed deadline, and then supplement its (the Plaintiffs) evidence as needed to defeat
the motion for summary judgment. Such procedure effectively nullifies the puipose and benefits
offered by summary judgment motions. After careful consideration, and respectfully, the Court
concludes that to receive Plaintiffs newly produced evidence under such circumstances would
constitute reversible error on the part of this Court.
The Plaintiff has been, for well over three years now, obligated to provide all information
relevant to this case to the Defendant. The Plaintiff failed to do so at his own risk. The Plaintiff
acknowledged that discovery had been completed prior to February 3, 2006. The Plaintiffs
production of, allegedly, key evidence some three years and six months after filing this case, and
over six months after the Plaintiff agreed that discovery was finished, is simply untimely. Therefore,
as to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement, this Court will only consider evidence
exchanged by the parties, and properly presented to the Court prior to August 1, 2006,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56©) states that summary judgment "shall be rendered
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

'Rule 26(a)(4)(c) does call for the exchange of exhibits thirty days prior to trial. The
practical implication of the rule is the closure of discovery at the exhibit exchange deadline.
However, all the rule does is imply the end of discovery, just as a dispositive motion deadline
implies the end of discovery. Both deadlines presuppose that the discovery period has ended.
Page 4 of
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is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The Utah Supreme Court, in National American Life
Insurance Company v. Bayou Country Club, Inc., 403 P.2d 26 (Utah 1965), stated that summary
judgment rules "should be liberally interpreted to effectuate their purpose, to effect the prompt
administration ofjustice, and to expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials where no triable issue
of fact is disclosed." Id. at 29 (citations omitted). The purpose of summary judgment is to "provide
a means of searching out the undisputed facts" to find if the matter can be resolved as a matter of
law, thereby conserving both party and court resources. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266,1267-68
(Utah 1976).
With the exception of evidence regarding the trenching and backfill studies, as conceded
in Defendant's Reply, the Court finds that Plaintiff, Sunridge Development, has failed to martial
admissible evidence as to its claim for damages. A simple statement that one has been damaged is
not evidence; it is a legal conclusion. This Court cannot make that unsupported conclusion, and
cannot refuse a motion for summary judgment where no material fact has effectively established the
issue. For these reasons, and those argued by the Defendant, which the Court adopts and
incorporates herein, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
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The Court further directs counsel for Defendant to prepare an Order consistent with this
ruling.

Dated this / ^ V ^ d a y of September, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

*&£10££o,

p G E FRED D. HOW.
district Court Judge
<r
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUNRIDGE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, et al.

STIPULATED MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No. 030400328
RB&G ENGINEERING, INC.,
Defendant.

Division No. 5

Plaintiffs Sunridge Development Corp. and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC, and defendant
RB&G Engineering Inc., by and through their respective counsel of record hereby stipulate as set
forth below and move the Court for a final, appealable order as follows:
1.

The Court granted partial summary judgment on September 1, 2005. This order is
final and appealable;

2.

02

The Court granted partial summary judgment on October 10, 2006, dismissing all
Plaintiffs remaining claims, except for Plaintiffs claim for the "RB&G

C \Documents and Setlings\CCC\Local Settings\Temp\stip mot dismiss.revised_l wpd
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Reports/Tests (post - 1995)." This is afinalorder, and PlaintifFs have waived
their right to appeal the October, 10, 2006 partial summary judgment;
3.

Plaintiffs remaining claim regarding URB&G Reports/Tests (post - 1995)" has
been fully comprised and settled and should be dismissed on its merits with
prejudice, each party to bear their respective attorneys fees and costs.

4.

All the issues, claims and causes of actions in this lawsuit have now been ruled
upon or otherwise determined, and the parties stipulate to a final order by this
court disposing of all issues in this case.
DATED this [\^~ day ofWtDvember, 2006.
/

HILL JOHNSON &S

<fr,
/

Stephen"" QiiesenlWry
^~*
AttoMeys ^bp^Sunridge Development Corp.
/and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC
DATED this ( u day of November, 2006.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

Craig
Zachary E. Peterson
Attorneys for RB&G Engineering Inc.
C:\Documents and Scttings\CCC\Local Settings\Temp\stip.mol.dismiss.re'wicd_l.wpd

•n iY

Tab 4

Page 1

LEXSEE 2008 UT APP 29

Sunridge Development Corporation; and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC, Plaintiffs and
Appellants, v. RB&G Engineering, Inc., Defendant and Appellee.
Case No. 20070099-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2008 UTApp 29; 177 PM 644; 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 30; 2008 Utah App. LEXIS 25

January 25, 2008, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1]
Fourth District, American Fork Department,
070100134. The Honorable Fred D. Howard.
CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, developer
and new company, challenged the judgment of the
Fourth District, American Fork Department, Utah, granting summary judgment in favor of appellee engineering
company, on claims of negligence and breach of contract.
OVERVIEW: The developer contracted with the engineering company to perform a geologic study of 10.2
acres, and to perform a geotechnical investigation of the
property. Based on the two reports, the developer proceeded with its plan to develop eighty-six units on the
property. The developer later formed the new company
for liability purposes, and conveyed the property to the
new company. Additional testing uncovered substantial
faults not reflected in the engineering company's earlier
reports, and the new company was forced to redesign its
development plan around the newly uncovered faults.
The reduction in units and the corresponding delays resulted in a claimed loss of well over one million dollars.
The trial court ruled in favor of the engineering company
on two separate motions for summary judgment. The
appellate court ruled that both the developer and the new
company were precluded from claiming any damages
against the engineering company, whether sounding in
contract or torts, because the developer and new company agreed to not appeal a second summary judgment in
favor of the engineering company.
OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed.

CORE TERMS: summary judgment, assignee, assignor,
contract claim, breach of contract, privity, faults, economic loss, geological, admit, final judgment, deadline,
litigate, dollar, dispositive, colleagues, question of law,
sworn statement, legal conclusion, issues of material
fact, abuse of discretion, contractual, genuine, obligor,
entities, facie, sworn, shoes, development plan, claims of
negligence
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Appellate Review > Standards of Review
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards >
Appropriateness
[HN1] Summary judgment is appropriate only when
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c). Whether a party is entitled to summary
judgment presents a question of law, and the appellate
court grants no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >
Abuse of Discretion
Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Rulings on
Evidence
[HN2] A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and its determination typically will only
be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Contracts Law > Performance > Assignment > General
Overview
Contracts Law > Third Parties > General Overview
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2008 UT App 29, *; 177 P.3d 644, **;
596 Utah Adv. Rep. 30; 2008 Utah App. LEXIS 25, ***
[HN3] Under the law of assignments, assignees are entitled to bring against the obligor any contractual action
the assignor could have brought. An assignee gains nothing more, and acquires no greater interest than had his
assignor. The assignee is subject to any defenses that
would have been good against the assignor; the assignee
cannot recover more than the assignor could recover; and
the assignee never stands in a better position than the
assignor. It is well established that an assignor cannot
assign rights he or she does not have. Conversely, an
assignment does not have the effect of canceling any
rights which other persons have in connection with a
contract. However, without a claim for damages, the
assignee has no breach of contract action.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Time
Limitations
[HN4] A party has thirty days to appeal a final judgment
and order. Utah R. App. P. 4(a).
COUNSEL: Stephen Quesenberry and Charles L. Perschon, Provo, for Appellants.
Craig C. Coburn, Zachary E. Peterson, Michael J. Howell, and Jennifer Mastrorocco, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
JUDGES: James Z. Davis, Judge. I CONCUR: Pamela
T. Greenwood, Presiding Judge. BENCH, Judge (dissenting).
OPINION BY: James Z. Davis
OPINION
[**644] DAVIS, Judge:
[*P1] Sunridge Development Corporation (SDC)
and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC (SEL) appeal from the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
RB&G Engineering, Inc. (RB&G) on claims of negligence and breach of contact. However, [**645] Plaintiffs agreed to not appeal a second summary judgment in
favor of RB&G, which concluded that SDC did not present prima facie evidence of damages. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND
[*P2] In 1993, SDC contracted with RB&G to perform a geologic study of 10.2 acres that would become
the Alpine Brook Development (the Property). The purpose of the 1993 study was to analyze potential faults
and other geologic features of the Property that could
affect SDC's ability to develop the Property. In 1995,
SDC contracted with RB&G to perform a geotechnical

investigation of the Property, whereby RB&G [***2]
was to determine whether geological hazards existed on
the Property and recommend foundation designs for
SDC's development plan. In the 1995 report, RB&G
concluded that the small faults on the Property were expected for the area and did not present problems for development. Based on these two RB&G reports, SDC
proceeded with its plan to develop eighty-six units on the
Property.
[*P31 In 1996, SDC principal Stephen Stewart
formed SEL for liability purposes, and SDC conveyed
the Property to SEL. The conveyance included the assignment to SEL of all of SDC's rights and claims in
relation to the various engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals. ' In 1998, when the first stage
of development was nearly complete, the Utah Geological Association recommended further testing of the
Property, which RB&G performed. This additional testing uncovered substantial faults not reflected in RB&G's
earlier reports, and SEL was forced to redesign its development plan around the newly uncovered faults. Because
SEL could no longer safely develop the lots located over
the faults and because the road location could not be
moved, the number of units to be developed was reduced
by fourteen. The [***3] reduction in units and the corresponding delays resulted in a claimed loss of well over
one million dollars.
1 For purposes of summary judgment, the parties centered their arguments on the effect of the
assignment and not on the underlying validity
thereof. At trial, however, SEL would have the
burden of proving the validity of the assignment
by a preponderance of the evidence.
[*P4] SDC and SEL both filed suit against RB&G,
alleging negligence and breach of contract. In August
and September of 2005, the trial court ruled in favor of
RB&G on two separate motions for summary judgment.
The first motion was primarily against SEL, arguing alternative rationales for prohibiting SEL from claiming
damages against RB&G: the economic loss rule, see
generally SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett,
Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, PP 32-35, 28
P. 3d 669, and a lack of privity between SEL and RB&G.
The second motion for summary judgment was against
SDC and alleged that SDC had failed to establish a prima
facie case for the claim that RB&G breached its contract
with SDC. Specifically, RB&G claimed SDC failed to
produce evidence of damages.2
2 We do not address Plaintiffs' arguments relating to [***4] the trial court's application of the
economic loss rule and its rejection of the adoption of the independent duty concept for engi-
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neers because our decision—based on RB&G's
motion for summary judgment against SDC—is
dispositive.
[*P5] The only evidence SDC presented in response to the second motion for summary judgement
came in the form of sworn affidavits. The trial court denied the admission of SDC's affidavits because they were
offered after the August 1, 2006 deadline for parties to
file dispositive motions. "Given this case history," the
trial court wrote, "the August 1, 2006 deadline presupposes an end of the discovery process." In granting the
motion, the trial court specifically found: "[SDC] has
failed to marshal admissible evidence as to its claim for
damages. A simple statement that one has been damaged
is not evidence; it is a legal conclusion."
[*P6] On December 18, 2006, the parties then
stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of SDC's
claims against RB&G for breach of contract; Plaintiffs
also agreed not to appeal the trial court's second summary judgment ruling. On January 5, 2007, the trial court
entered the final judgment and order thereon. Plaintiffs
now challenge the trial [***5] court's [**646] grant of
RB&G's first motion for summary judgment.
ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[*P7] Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's grant of
summary judgment on SEL's breach of contract and negligence claims in favor of RB&G. 3 [HN1] Summary
judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment presents a question of law, and we grant no deference to the
trial court's legal conclusions and review them for correctness. See Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co., 2007 UT 39, P
10, 164 P.3d 353] Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
231, 235 (Utah 1993). Yet, "[a] [HN2] trial court has
broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and its
determination typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of discretion." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT
96, P 20, 989 P.2d 52; see also State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003
UT 32, P 8, 76 P. 3d 1165 ("Although the admission or
exclusion of evidence is a question of law, we review a
trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence for an abuse of discretion.").
3 Per stipulation, Plaintiffs do not challenge the
[***6] trial court's grant of summary judgment on
SDC's breach of contract claim, nor the refusal of
the trial court to admit the affidavits into evidence. We therefore do not address these issues.
See State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 n.3
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (declining to consider is-

sues not raised on appeal when a party the had
opportunity to do so).
ANALYSIS
[*P8] SEL argues that it should be allowed to pursue its breach of contract claim against RB&G beyond
the summary judgment stage because the assignment of
the contracts in question allows SEL, as the assignee, to
assert the claims against RB&G that SDC would have
been able to assert had the assignment never taken place.
[HN3] Under the law of assignments, "[assignees] are
entitled to bring against the [obligor] any contractual
action the [assignor] could have brought." Spears v.
Warr, 2002 UT 24, P 40, 44 P.3d 742. "[A]n assignee
gains nothing more, and acquires no greater interest than
had his assignor . . . ." Aird Ins. Agency v. Zions First
Nat'l Bank, 612 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980) (citing Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963);
Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, 885, affd
in part and set aside in part, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d
791 (1957)); [***7] see also SME Indus., Inc., 2001 UT
54, P 16, 28 P.3d 669 ("The assignee is subject to any
defenses that would have been good against the [assignor]; the assignee cannot recover more than the assignor could recover; and the assignee never stands in a
better position than the assignor."* (alteration in original)
(quoting 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments § 144 (1999))); West
v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 2006 UT App 222, n.l, 139 P. 3d
1059 ("It is well established that an assignor cannot assign rights he or she does not have."). Conversely, "an
assignment does not have the effect of canceling any
rights which other persons have in connection with [a
contract]." Tanner, 305 P.2d at 885. However, "without
a claim for damages, the [assignee] ha[s] no breach of
contract action." West, 139 P. 3d 1059, 2006 UT App 222,
n.l (citing Bait v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, P
14,20P.3d388).
[*P9] Here, at the time of assignment, RB&G had
already completed its geological surveys under its contracts with SDC. In response to the second motion for
summary judgment, SDC attempted to submit affidavits
into evidence regarding damages. But the trial court refused to admit the affidavits, ruling that they were not
timely, and this ruling [***8] was included in the second
summary judgment. Thereafter, Plaintiffs stipulated not
to appeal this second summary judgment ruling. The
parties entered into this stipulation on December 18,
2006, and the trial court entered the final judgment and
order on January 5, 2007. [HN4] Plaintiffs had thirty
days to appeal the final judgment and order. See Utah R.
App. P. 4(a). However, per the stipulation, they did not
do so. Since assignment merely allows the assignee to
stand in the shoes of the assignor, SEL is precluded from
claiming damages against RB&G-an essential element
of any claim, see Campbell, [**647] Maack & Sessions
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v. Debiy, 2001 UT App 397, P 21, 38 P.3d P^-because
SEL stipulated that SDC failed to prove damages against
RB&G. SEL is similarly precluded from claiming the
affidavits were improperly excluded.4
4 While it is true that "it only takes one sworn
statement under oath to dispute the averments on
the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact," thereby precluding summary judgment, Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1975), if such evidence is untimely it may
still properly be excluded, even if the result leads
to a grant of summary judgment against the
[***9] party seeking its introduction. Cf. Gerbich
v. Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37, P 17, 977 P.2d 1205
(M[W]e conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it prevented the inspector
from testifying as an expert based on the lateness
of the designation and the fact that Numed's
counsel did not have an opportunity to either prepare a cross-examination or call rebuttal witnesses.").
[*P10] Plaintiffs argue that at the time of assignment, damages were not yet ripe because the errors in
RB&G's geological surveys were not discovered until
years later. Nevertheless, even after the errors were discovered, SEL never pursued a damages claim against
SDC for conveying SEL a property allegedly worth over
a million dollars less than SEL paid. SEL cannot be
"permitted to enjoy the benefits of [its] separate corporate structure for some purposes while also claiming [that
the trial court] elevate[d] form over substance in an attempt to [attach SEL's damages against SDC to RB&G]."
Sachs v. Lesser, 2007 UT App 169, P 51, 163 P.3d 662
(citing Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d
888, 891 (Utah 1975)), cert, granted, 168 P.3d 1264
(Utah 2007).
CONCLUSION
[*P11] SDC's assignment to SEL of all rights
[***10] and claims relating to the contracts for the survey work of RB&G put SEL in the same position as
SDC-without admissible evidence of damages against
RB&G. Because Plaintiffs agreed not to appeal the trial
court's granting of the second motion for summary
judgment, both SDC and SEL are precluded from claiming any damages against RB&G, whethersounding in
contract or torts. We therefore affirm the decision of the
trial court.
James Z. Davis, Judge
[*P12] I CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

DISSENT BY: Russell W. Bench
DISSENT
BENCH, Judge (dissenting):
[*P13] Procedurally, SEL's claims were dismissed
entirely in September 2005 when the trial court ruled that
there was a lack of privity and applied the economic loss
rule, thereby foreclosing SEL's breach of contract and
negligence claims respectively. In October 2006, the trial
court dismissed SDC's breach of contract claim for failing to timely produce evidence of damages. Finally, in
December 2006, a stipulation was entered into by which
SDC, as the only remaining "Plaintiff," agreed to settle
the lone outstanding claim against RB&G and waive its
right to appeal the October 2006 summary judgment order. The issues before us on appeal are focused on the
summary judgment [***11] entered against SEL in September of 2005.
[*P14] The majority fails to analyze the central issue presented: whether SEL was in privity with RB&G
for purposes of asserting a breach of contract claim. The
trial court dismissed SEL's case at the summary judgment stage for a lack of privity. Yet, my colleagues do
not even attempt to address whether this determination
was in error. Instead, they skip ahead and use the trial
court's later dismissal of SDC's breach of contract claim,
on procedural grounds, as retroactive justification for
thwarting SEL's appeal.
[*P15] Privity is a paramount consideration in this
case. If the trial court was wrong about SEL's privity
with RB&G, which I believe it was, then SDC's claim
should have never gone forward as it did. SEL, as the
assignee, is the proper party to litigate the breach of contract claim. The effect of the majority's opinion is to require an assignee like SEL to rely upon its assignor to
litigate the issue of damages against the obligor. This
line of reasoning is contrary to the rule that assignees
stand in the shoes of their assignors. See 6 Am. Jur. 2d
Assignments § 144 [**648] (1999). Although an assignee's damages are limited to those damages the assignor [***12] would have suffered, the assignee should
not be required to depend upon the assignor to litigate on
its behalf. The majority pays lip service to the notion that
SEL and SDC should be treated as separate and distinct
entities and then effectively treats them as one, binding
SEL to the result of SDC's failed litigation, ostensibly
because the two corporate entities are run by the same
person.
[*P16] In affirming, the majority also ignores evidence in the record that should have moved SEL's claim
past summary judgment. In April 2005, more than a year
before the trial court's deadline for submitting evidence
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of damages, SDC principal Stephen Stewart filed a
sworn affidavit with the trial court. The affidavit outlined, in specific dollar amounts, SDC's damages resulting from the failure of RB&G to detect the pertinent
faults on the Property. This "one sworn statement" is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). The
record shows that the trial court's vague parenthetical
reference to the affidavit as a "generalized summary,"
stated in the order dismissing SDC's claim for failure to
prove damages, amounts to an impermissible consideration [***13] of the weight or credibility of evidence at
the summary judgment stage. See Sandberg v. Klein, 576
P.2dl291, 1292 (Utah 1978).
[*P17] Finally, the majority has not addressed
SEL's alternative argument on appeal, namely that the

economic loss rule should not bar its claim of negligence. Without explanation, my colleagues conclude that
their decision is dispositive and they need not consider
SEL's alternative arguments on appeal. But because they
hold that SEL has no contractual claim to pursue, my
colleagues must deal with SEL's alternative argument for
negligence.
[*P18] For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully
dissent. In my view, SEL should be allowed to pursue its
breach of contract claim against RB&G and prove damages in accordance with the law of assignments. I would
therefore reverse the summary judgment and remand for
further proceedings on SEL's claim for breach of contract.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
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NOTICE:
[*1] THIS DECISION IS UNREPORTED AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER
APPELLATE REVIEW COUNSEL IS CAUTIONED
TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION
OF THE STATUS OF THIS CASE
JUDGES: Jon M Alander, Judge of the Superior Court
OPINION BY: Jon M Alander
OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
In this action, the plaintiff seeks to recover damages
for the loss of use of its building damaged by fire as a
result of the alleged negligence of the defendant Design
Learned, Inc ("Design Learned"), an engineering firm
The plaintiff claims that, during construction of the
building, Design Learned negligently failed to specify
non-combustible flooring or a heat shield near burner
units, resulting in a fire While the plaintiff had a contiact with the construction manager of the project, it
lacked a contract with Design Learned Design Learned
has filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that
the plaintiffs claim is barred by the economic loss doctime
The appellate courts of this state have not lecognized the economic loss rule advocated by Design
Learned, that, in the absence of privity of contract or m
the absence of injury to person or property, the plaintiff
may not recover m tort for economic losses The decision
[*2] in Flagg Energy Development Corp v General

Motors Corp, 244 Conn 126, 155, 709 A 2d 1075
(1998), is inapposite as it addresses the remedies available under the Umform Commercial Code for injuries
resulting from the sale of an allegedly defective product
In the context of this case, given the allegations of
the complaint, the applicable law remams that a tortfeasor is liable for negligently causing harm that was foreseeable Coburn v Lenox Homes Inc, 186 Conn 370,
441 A 2d 620 (1982) Design Learned's knowledge that
the plaintiff would rely on its work eliminates any concern that the lack of an economic loss rule of the sort
propounded by the defendant may result in unlimited
liability See Ciaigv Everett M Biooks Co , 351 Mass
497, 222 NE2d 752, 755 (1967)
In short, I find persuasive the well reasoned opinions
m RCD-Hudson v TAT Mason Enterprises Superior
Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No CV 00
598478 S, (Jan 17, 2001) (Beach, J ) (29 Conn L Rprr
261), and Insurance Company ofNoith America v Town
of Manchester, 17 F Supp 2d 81 (D Conn 1998), rejecting the application of a blanket [*3] prohibition on
the recovery of economic losses resulting from negligent
conduct in the absence of privity of contract Accoidmgly, Design Learned's motion for summary judgment is
hereby denied
BY THE COURT
Jon M Alander
Judge of the Supenor Court
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DISPOSITION:
and denied in part.

Summary judgment granted in part

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant engineering
company supplied engineering services to a town, and
reviewed plaintiff developer's application for subdivision
approval. The developer alleged claims of negligence,
breach of contract, breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, contending the company performed the engineering services negligently.
The company moved for summary judgment.
OVERVIEW: Pursuant to precedent, summary judgment had to be denied on the negligence claim. The
company knew the identity of the developer, and knew
that the developer would be relying on its work. However, there was an absence of evidence from which a
fair-minded jury could conclude that the developer had a
contract with the company. The company's only contract
in the case was with the town. Thus, the company was
entitled to summary judgment on the contract claim.
Also, because there was no contract with the developer
and no supplying of goods by the company to the developer, there was no implied warranty of merchantability
or fitness for a particular purpose, and the company was
entitled to summary judgment on these implied warranty
claims. Finally, the company was entitled to summary
judgment on the Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A because it was
not engaged in trade or commerce with the developer
when it reviewed the plans for the planning board in ful-

fillment of the planning board's statutory duties, and because there was an absence of evidence in the summary
judgment materials that the company engaged in any
unfair or deceptive conduct.
OUTCOME: The company's motion for summary
judgment was denied as to the negligence claim, and
granted in all other respects.
CORE TERMS: engineering, summary judgment, public employee, engineer, negligence claim, economic
losses, particular purpose, immunity, fitness, warranties
of merchantability, public employer, contractor, parttime, case law, warranty claim, right to exercise, independent contractor, absence of evidence, statutory duties,
full-time, supplied, drainage, supplier, commerce, required to pay, negligently, retention, assigned, pond
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Governments > Local Governments > Employees &
Officials
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Employees
[HN1] The "public employee" definition in Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 258, § /, includes part-time as well as full-time
officers and employees.

Governments > Local Governments > Employees &
Officials
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Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Employees
Labor & Employment Law > Employment Relationships > At-Will Employment > Employers
[HN2] The "public employee" definition in Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 258, § /, must also be read in conjunction with
the "public employer" definition in the same section. To
be a public employee the person must be an officer or
employee "of any public employer." The "public employer" definition includes towns and other government
entities if the employer "exercises direction and control"
over the public employee. Consistently with these interlocking definitions, the case law has relied on the principal's right to exercise direction and control as a primary
consideration in determining whether a particular defendant is a public employee for Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258
immunity purposes.
JUDGES: [*1] Charles J. Hely, Justice.
OPINION BY: Charles J. Hely
OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Introduction
The defendant Atlantic Design Engineers supplied
engineering services to the Town of Middleborough and
served part-time as the town engineer. Atlantic was assigned by the Middlebourough Planning Board to review
the plaintiff Nestlenook's application for approval of a
subdivision proposed by Nestlenook. Nestlenook claims
that Atlantic performed the engineering services negligently. Specifically, Nestlenook claims that Atlantic's
comment letter to the town negligently required Nestlenook to design and construct a retention pond as part of
the drainage system for the subdivision. Nestlenook contends that its construction of the retention pond in compliance with Atlantic's comment letter caused it economic losses and property damage.
Nestlenook alleges claims for negligence, breach of
contract, breach of implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose, and violation of
G.L.c. 93A, Only the negligence claim can survive
summary judgment.
B. Public Employee Immunity

and employees. Atlantic's part-time status with the town
does not preclude public employee immunity.
[HN2] The "public employee" definition in Section
1, must also be read in conjunction with the "public employer" definition in the same section. To be a public
employee the person must be an officer or employee "of
any public employer." The "public employer" definition
includes towns and other government entities if the employer "exercises direction and control" over the public
employee. Consistently with these interlocking definitions, the case law has relied on the principal's right to
exercise direction and control as a primary consideration
in determining whether a particular defendant is a public
employee for Chapter 258 immunity purposes. Kelley v.
Rossi, 395 Mass. 659, 661-64, 481 N.EJd 1340
(1985)\Smith v. Steinberg, 395 Mass. 666, 669, 481
NE.2d 1344 (1985).
Although Atlantic may have held the title of town
engineer as a single, [*3] full-time employee might in
other towns, the evidence is that Atlantic was an independent contractor. The evidence supports Nestlenook's
argument that Atlantic was not subject to the right of
direction and control by the town in how it performed its
engineering services. Atlantic no doubt was subject to
some control by the town in that the town assigned it
projects and identified the scope of each particular assignment. The manner of carrying out these assignments
was still a matter of Atlantic's independent professional
engineering judgment. The town was not Atlantic's only
engineering client, and this is also a relevant factor. Atlantic is a private corporation, and it acts through a group
of human agents rather than one person. These factors
also lessen the town's right to exercise direction and control over how Atlantic performed its professional services.
Suffice it to say that Atlantic has not demonstrated
that it was not an independent contractor, and it has not
shown that the town retained the right to control the
manner of Atlantic's performance of its professional services. See Kelley v. Rossi, supra; Smith v. Steinberg,
supra; Williams v. Hartman, 413 Mass. 398, 400-01, 597
N.E.2d 1024 (1997); [*4] Hopper v. Callahan, 408
Mass. 621, 634, 562 N.E.2d 822 (1990); Thornton v.
Commonwealth, 28 Mass.App.Ct. 511, 514, 552 NE.2d
601 (1990); compare McNamara v. Honeyman, 406
Mass. 43, 48, 546 N.E.2d 139 (1989); Williams v.
Bresnahan, 27 Mass.App.Ct. J91, 536 NE.2d 365
(1989); Florio v. Kennedy, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 917, 464
NE.2d 1373 (1984).

Atlantic is not entitled to summary [*2] judgment
under the public employee immunity in G.L.c. 258, § 2.

C. Economic Loss Rule

[HN1] The "public employee" definition in G.L.c.
258, § 1, includes part-time as well as full-time officers

Atlantic is not entitled to summary judgment under the
economic loss rule. Nestlenook has presented evidence
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that it sustained physical damage to its property, rather
than just economic loss, allegedly caused by negligence
of Atlantic. Priority Finishing Corp. v. LAL Construction
Corp., 40 Mass.App.Ct 719, 721, 667 N.E.2d 290
(1996).
D. Negligence and Duty
Atlantic argues that it performed engineering services
only to the town Planning Board and that it cannot be
liable in negligence to Nestlenook because it owed no
legal duty to Nestlenook. Atlantic relies on the lender's
attorney malpractice case of Page v. Frazier, 388 Mass.
55,445N.E.2dl48(1982).
As Nestlenook correctly points out, [*5] however,
the negligence claim against Atlantic in this case is much
more analogous to the negligence claim against the engineer in Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 351 Mass. 497,
500-01, 222 N.E.2d 752 (1967). In Craig, the court reversed the directed verdict for the defendant engineer on
a negligence claim despite the lack of a contractual relationship between the plaintiff contractor and the engineer. The defendant engineer in Craig knew the identity
of the plaintiff contractor and knew that the contractor
would be relying on the locations of the stakes that the
defendant engineer put in for the landowner. Id. Under
the authority of Craig, summary judgment must be denied on the negligence claim.
E. Contract
There is an absence of evidence from which a fairminded jury could conclude that Nestlenook had a contract with Atlantic. Atlantic was selected by the town to
perform engineering services for the town. It is true that
Nestlenook reimbursed the town for Atlantic's engineering services. If Nestlenook wanted to proceed with the
subdivision application, it had no choice. Nestlenook was
required to pay this reimbursement to the town by the
[*6] Planning Board's procedures.
Nestlenook did not pay Atlantic for services provided to Nestlenook. Nestlenook instead was required to
pay to the town the town's costs for having Atlantic perform engineering services for the town. The services
Atlantic provided for the town were to determine for the
town whether Nestlenook's plans satisfied the town's
subdivision regulations and to make comments on what
type of modifications would be required for compliance.
Atlantic was hired to protect the town, not Nestlenook.
Atlantic's only contract in this case was with the town.
Atlantic is entitled to summary judgment on the contract
claim.
F. Implied Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for a Particular Purpose

If the defendant had been a supplier of a product or
other "goods" to the plaintiff, there would be an implied
warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose, provided that the plaintiff was a person whom
the defendant might reasonably have expected to use the
goods. G.L.c. 106, §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2-318. Lack of privity between the user of the goods and the supplier would
[*7J not be a defense to a breach of warranty claim in
such circumstances. G.L.c. 106, §2-318.
In this case Atlantic supplied no "goods" to Nestlenook. G.L.c. 106, § 2-105 (definition of "goods"); Garcia
v. Kusan, Inc., 39 Mass.App.Ct. 322, 327, 655 N.E.2d
1290 (1995) ("Even assuming in the plaintiffs favor that
the [floor hockey] game-the concept and instructionswas the "product" which was sold . . ., there is no legal
support for imposing liability on such a "product" where
the seller does not provide a tangible item as well as instructions"). Because there was no contract with Nestlenook and no supplying of goods by Atlantic to Nestlenook, there was no implied warranty of merchantability
or fitness for a particular purpose. Atlantic is entitled to
summary judgment on these implied warranty claims.
G. Chapter 93A and Trade or Commerce
On the Chapter 93A claim, Atlantic is entitled to
summary judgment for two reasons. The summary judgment evidence demonstrates that Atlantic's connection
with Nestlenook in this case was strictly in the context of
Atlantic providing engineering services to the town. [*8]
Nestlenook alleges that it relied on Atlantic's recommended changes to the drainage plans, but that reliance
was only in the context of Nestlenook's application to the
town Planning Board for subdivision approval. Atlantic's
dealings with Nestlenook were solely as an agent for the
town Planning Board in the course of the Planning Board
performing its statutory duties under the Subdivision
Control Law, G.L.c. 41, §§ 81K-81GG.
Atlantic's performance of engineering services for
the town Planning Board involved no business context
relationship between Atlantic and Nestlenook. Under the
Chapter 93A case law involving governmental defendants, Atlantic was therefore not engaged in trade or
commerce with Nestlenook when it reviewed Nestlenook's plans for the Planning Board in fulfillment of the
Planning Board's statutory duties. Boston Housing Authority v. Howard, 427 Mass. 537, 695 N.E.2d 192
(1998); Lafayette Place Associates v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 427 Mass. 509, 534, 694 N.E.2d 820
(1998); PeabodyN.E., Inc. v. Marshfield, 426 Mass. 436,
439-40, 689 N.E.2d 774 (1998); Poznik v. Medical Professional Insurance Association, 417 Mass. 48, 52, 628
N.E.2d 1 (1994); [*9] All Seasons Sendees, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Health and Hospitals of Boston, 416
Mass. 269, 271, 620 N.E.2d 778 (1993); Morton v.

Page 4
17 Mass. L. Rep. 25; 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 400, *

Hanover, 43 MassApp.Ct 197, 206, 682 N.E.2d 889
(1997); Bretton v. State Lottery Commission, 41
MassApp.Ct 736, 673 N.E.2d 76 (1996).
The second reason why Atlantic has no Chapter 93A
liability is that there is an absence of evidence in the
summary judgment materials that Atlantic engaged in
any unfair or deceptive conduct, even assuming that
there was negligence by Atlantic in reviewing and commenting on Nestlenook's plans.

H. Order
Summary judgment will enter for the defendant
dismissing all claims in the plaintiffs complaint except
Count I alleging negligence.
October 22, 2003
Charles J. Hely
Justice

